Russia in a multipolar world : its place on the international stage and its foreign policy by Ili, Dumitru
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC A MONTRÉAL 
RUSSIA IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD. 
ITS PLACE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE 
AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY 
THE SIS 
PRESENTED 
AS PARTIAL REQUIREMENT 
OF THE MASTERS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE SCIENCE 
BY 
DUMITRUILI 
APRIL 2013 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL 
Service des bibliothèques · 
Ayartlssamant 
La diffusion de ce mémoire se fait dans le• respect des droits de son auteur, qui a signé 
le formulaire Autorisation de rapioduire. et de diffuser un travail de recherche de cycles 
sup~rfaurs ( SDU-522 - Rév .01-2006). Cette autorisation . stipule que ccconformément . à 
l'article 11 du Règlement no 8 dea études de cycles supérieurs, [l'auteur] concède à 
l'Université du Québec à Montréal une licence non exclusive d'utilisation et de . 
publlca'tlon de la totalité ou d'une partie importante de [son] travail de recherche pour 
des fins pédagogiques et non commèrcialea. Plus précisément, [l'auteur) autorise 
l'Université du Québec à Montréal à reproduire, diffuser, prêter, distribuer ou vendre dea · 
copies de. [son] travail de recherche à dea fins non commerciales sur quelque support 
que ce soit, y compris l'Internet Cette licence et cette autorisation n'entrainent pas une 
renonciation de [la) part [de l'auteur) à [ses) droits moraux ni à [ses) droits da propriété 
intellectuelle. Sauf ententâ contraire, [l'auteur) conserve la liberté de diffuser et de 
commercialiser ou non ce travail dont [ill possède un exemplaire. ~ 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC A MONTRÉAL 
LA RUSSIE DANS UN MONDE MULTIPOLAIRE. 
SA PLACE SUR LA SCÈNE INTERNA TI ON ALE ET 
POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE RUSSE 
MÉMOIRE 
PRÉSENTÉ 
COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE 
DE LA MAÎTRISE EN SCIENCE POLITIQUE 
PAR 
DUMITRU ILl 
AVRIL 2013 
REMERCIEMENTS 
Je remercie mon directeur, Monsieur Jacques Lévesque, 
pour son support continu, son encouragements et son savoir illimité. 
Je remercie l'Université du Québec à Montréal 
pour 1' excellente organisation des études. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ......... .. ..... ...... ..... .... .... .. ... .. .... .. ..... ........ .. .... ...... .. .. ..... ................. .. .. .... ... .. .... .... ... ... V 
INTRODUCTION .... .... .... ....... .... .. .. ... .... ....... ................. .. .................. .. ......... .. ......... .. .. .. .. .. .. ... . l 
a. Problématique .. ................. ... ... ..... .... .. ....... .. .. ....... .. .... .......... ........ .. ....... .. ............. ..... ...... 1 
b. Methodology and Organization of Content.. .. .... .. .......... .. ............ ..... ..... .... .. ... .. .. .. ......... 9 
c. Sources ... .. .. ....... .. .. .... .. ... .... .. ... ... ... .. ... ...... .... ... ...... .. ... .. ........ ... ................... ....... .... .. .. ... 10 
CHAPTER 1 
WALZ'S NEOREALIST THEORY AND IDENTIFYING RUSSIA ' S SECURITY 
THREATS .. .. ..... .... .. ... .. ........ .................. .. .... ... .... .. .. .... .......... .... ... .. ........ .. .... .................... .. .. .. 12 
1.1 Waltz's Structural realism ........ .... ...... .. .... .. .......... ... .. .. .... .. .. ...... ................. .. .. ... ........ . 13 
1.2 Criticism ofNeorealism ... ... ........... ............... .. ... .... ......... .. ... .... ...... ......... ....... .. .. .. .. ... 16 
1.3 Applying Neorealist Principles to Russian Case .. .. .. .. .. ........ ............... .. .................. .. 18 
CHAPTER2 
RUSSIA AND NATO: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION AND BACK TO 
REALISM ...... .... ................. .. ... .. ........ ... ...... .. ............. .............. .. .. ...... ........... ........... ... .. ......... . 35 
2.1 Russia's Warmed Relations with the West Turn Sour.. .. .... .. ..................................... 37 
2.2 NA TO's Enlargement to t11e East; a Perceived and Real Threat for Russia .... ........ .. 38 
2.3 Russia Addresses its Perceived Security Threat from the West: from Retaliation to 
Cooperation .. .. ....... .. ...... ....... .. .... ... ... .. ... .... ..... .. .... ... ........... .... .. ............. .. ............................. 43 
2.4 Russia-West Relations Tum Sour Anew; Provoking More Aggressive Russian 
Retaliation .. .. .... .... ......... .. .. ......... .. ........... .. ..... .. .. .. ... ...... .. ....... .. ........... .. .... ... .. .... ... .. ...... .. ..... 44 
2.5 Summary ofRussia-West Relations ................................... ... .......... ...... .. .... ..... .... .... 51 
CHAPTER 3 
SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ... ........ ......... .. .. .. ..... ...... .. ..... .. ... .. .. .... .... ... .. .... ... .. .... .... .. ... .. 55 
3.1 Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue .. .. .......... ...... .... .. .. .... .. .... ... .. .. ........ .. .. .... .. .... .... ..... .. .. ... 57 
3.2 Sino - Russian Cooperation within Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) ..... 62 
3.3 Resuming Sino-Russian Relations ...... .. ...... .......... .. .......... .... .. .. .. .. .... .. ............... .. ...... 71 
CHAPTER4 
RUSSIAN ROLE IN POST SOVIET REGION. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RUSSIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY .......... .. .............. .. ..................................... .. .. ............. ........... .. ... ........ ..... . 76 
4.1 The Russian Ruling Elite and the Three Visions ofRussian Foreign Policy .... .. ...... . 77 
4.2 Russian Identity and Russian National Idea.. ..... .... ...... ... .... .... ... .... .. ... ...... ... .. .. ........ .. 83 
iv 
4.3 Russian Influence and Actions in Post-Soviet Territories ... .... .. ...... ....... ... .. .. ....... ..... . 89 
4.4 Russia ' s Leadership Role in Regional Institutions ... .......... .... .... .. ... ... ... ....... ... .. ... ..... . 93 
4. 5 Resuming Russian Foreign Policy in "Near Abroad" .... .. .. .. ...... ...... ... ... ..... ....... .... .. . 97 
CONCLUSIONS ....... ............ ... ... ....... .. ....... .. ..... ........ ...... ...... .. .. ............ ................... .. .. ....... 100 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....... .. ..... ................... ....... ... ... .... ..... .... .. .... ...... ..... ... ... .. .. ..... ... ..... ...... ...... .. 104 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis will explore Russia 's foreign policy and foreign relations in the changing, 
multipolar world, specifically since the year 2000. The beginning of the twenty-first century 
was characterized by severa! major transformations in international politics. Two such 
transformations in particular stand out as having forced Russia to reexamine its position in 
the world, particularly in relation to the Western and Eastern powers. The first is the graduai 
decline of the United States as global hegemon, nam ely since 2003, which has created 
favorable conditions for the emergence of new pol es. The second is the movement of the 
Kremlin ' s foreign po licy away from the liberal course of rapid Western integration that it 
had adopted in 1992 toward the balance of power poli ci es that had been in place sin ce 
antiquity. While this shift began in 1997, it solidified after Russia ' s military intervention in 
Georgia in 2008. Russia's firm return to its balance-of-power policies is notable bccause it 
challenges the role of the United States in the former Soviet region (Mankoff, 2009; Hopf, 
2010). 
The central question this paper will explore is this: What is Russia 's place in the new 
world order? More specifically, how does Russia perceive itself in relation to the West and 
East, and how has this self-perception shaped the priori ti es of its foreign policy? This paper 
will focus on Russia 's relations with the United States and China since the millennium. It 
will be argued that these relations, together with Russia ' s general self- perception as a great 
power, have profotmdly shaped the country ' s current foreign policy. It will be illustrated 
that, consequent to the fact that neither China nor the United States is willing to treat Russia 
as an equal partner, Russia has been (and will be) motivated to assert itselfas an independent 
hegemonie power over the space of the former Soviet Union. 
This position will be forwarded through the analysis of case studies on Russia ' s 
relations with the United States and China during the past decade. The essence of these 
relations is believed to be Russia's opposition to NATO 's enlargement and Russia ' s 
cooperation with China on security and energy, respectively . To gain a holistic 
understanding ofhow the aforementioned relations have shaped Russia 's foreign policy, 
neo-realist and social constructivist theories will be placed in juxtaposition to these case 
studies. Through the lens ofWaltz's neorealist paradigm, this paper strives to outline the 
security threats and dilemmas for Moscow ' s policymakcrs at the structural leve! and their 
impact on the country ' s external affairs . Through the use of the constructivist lens, the 
influence of the Russian identity and Russia' s historical background on the country ' s foreign 
policy at the state and individuallevel will be explored. These theories will subsequently be 
tested for their usefulness in understanding and explaining Russia 's recent, significant 
political actions and the country ' s present place in the world. 
This research is of value to the field ofpolitical science, as Russia 's foreign policy 
has historically affected the stability and security of the European continent, and it continues 
to do so today. Recent events, su ch as Russia 's relative success in opposing NATO 
enlargement, demonstrate the growth of the country 's role and power in the world as weil as 
the complexity of its political methods. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse explorera la politique étrangère de la Russie et les relations 
internationales dans le changement, monde multipolaire, spécifiquement depuis l' an 2000. 
Le début du XXIème siècle a été marqué par plusieurs grandes transformations dans la 
politique internationale. Ce sont: la diminution progressive des États-Unis en tant que 
puissance hégémonique mondiale et l'émergence de nouveaux pôles; le revirement politique 
de la politique étrangère du Kremlin à l'écart du parcours libéral de l'intégration occidentale 
rapide. Tout cela force la Russie à réexaminer sa position dans le monde, en particulier par 
rapport aux puissances occidentales et orientales. 
La question principale que cet exposé explorera est la suivante: Quelle est la place de 
la Russie dans le nouvel ordre international? Plus particulièrement, comment la Russie se 
perçoit par rapport à l'Occident et l'Orient, et comment cette perception de soi à établi les 
priorités de sa politique étrangère? Ce rapport se concentrera sur les relations de la Russie 
avec les Etats-Unis et la Chine depuis les années 2000. On dira que ces relations, avec la 
perception russe générale de soi comme une grande puissance, ont profondément façonné la 
politique étrangère actuelle du pays. On démontrera que, suite au fait que ni la Chine ni les 
Etats-Unis sont disposés à traiter la Russie comme un partenaire égal, la Russie a été (et sera) 
motivée à s'affirmer comme une puissance hégémonique indépendante sur l'espace de l'ex-
Union soviétique. 
Cette position sera transmise à travers l'analyse d'études de cas sur les relations de la 
Russie avec les Etats-Unis et la Chine au cours de la dernière décennie. L'essence de ces 
relations est considérée comme l'opposition de la Russie à l'élargissement de l'OTAN et de la 
coopération de la Russie avec la Chine en matière de sécurité et de l'énergie, respectivement. 
Pour acquérir une compréhension globale de la manière dont les rapports précités ont 
façonné la politique étrangère de la Russie, le néo-réaliste et les théories constructivistes 
sociales seront placés en juxtaposition à ces études de cas. À travers la lentille de néoréaliste 
le paradigme de Waltz, le présent document s'efforce d ' exposer les menaces pour la sécurité 
et les dilemmes pour décideurs politiques de Moscou sur le plan structurel et leurs 
répercussions sur les affaires extérieures du pays. Grâce à l'utilisation de la lentille 
constructiviste, l'influence de l'identité de la Russie et le contexte historique de la Russie sur 
la politique étrangère du pays au niveau de l'individu sera explorée. Ces théories seront par la 
suite testés pour leur utilité pour comprendre et expliquer les récentes actions politiques 
importantes de la Russie et la place actuelle du pays dans le monde. 
Cette recherche revêt une valeur dans le champ de la science politique, la politique 
étrangère de la Russie a toujours influé sur la stabilité et la sécurité du continent européen, et 
elle continue de le faire aujourd'hui. Les événements récents, tels que le succès relatif de la 
Russie en s'opposant à l'élargissement de l'OTAN, démontrent la croissance du rôle et de la 
puissance du pays dans le monde ainsi que la complexité de ses méthodes politiques. 
Mots clés: l'élargissement de l'OTAN, politique étrangère de la Russie dans monde 
multipolaire, Chine, des États-Unis, CIS 
INTRODUCTION 
a. Problématique 
Two important political milestones have restructured the international order for the 
past twenty-five years. The first is the faU of the Berlin Wall in 1989, followed by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which marked the end of the Cold War. The 
end of global bipolarity signaled the promise and hope for effective cooperation in 
international relations. This re-inspired liberal scholars of international politics 
(Fukuyama, 1993) and challenged the traditional views of realist theory. By contrast, 
the end of global bipolarity would also ultimately give rise to a historically 
unprecedented unique global superpower- the United States of America. 
The second major milestone comprises the tragic events of September 11, which 
highlighted different kinds of trans-national non-state security threats 1 in the 
international system. Despite the prominence of these threats, the liberal hope for 
interstate cooperation to fight these challenges did not occur. By contrast, states 
continued to play the major role in the international system, thereby firmly returning 
to balance-of-power policies. Russia - US relations in regard to NATO enlargement 
alone clearly demonstrate the return of realist principles in international affairs. 
Furthermore, the United States' decision to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan (2001) 
and the country's unilateral actions in Iraq (2003) subsequent to 9/11 fueled the 
United States' decline as a global hegemon (Haas, 2008). 
The world is no longer the same as it was in 2000-2001. As underscored by severa! 
international relations scholars, in the past decade, a new order of the international 
systems and poles have emerged (Steve, 2002; Haas, 2008). The lack of a clear vision 
of the structure of the new world among international relations scholars has motivated 
1 Here, 1 refer to phenomena th at are characteristic of globalization su ch as international terrorism, 
transnational crime, famine, climate change, pollution, etc. 
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of the structure ofthe new world among international relations scholars has motivated 
me to research Russia's place in this new emerging world and Moscow's foreign 
policy priorities. 
In this thesis, I shall examine the following questions: What are the priorities of 
Russianjoreign policy in the new emerging world arder? Does Russia see itse!fin an 
alliance with the West, with China and other BJUC members, or as a new 
independent regional power? To answer these questions, I will examine the priorities, 
goals, and methods of Russia's foreign policy under the leadership of Putin-
Medvedev. Several case studies, specifically on Russia 's relations with the United 
States and China, will be analyzed. Furthermore, the principles of neorealist, 
neoclassical realist and social constructivist theories will be juxtaposed with these 
case studies to gain a holistic understanding of contemporary realities in Russian 
foreign affairs. Through the use of the neorealist theoretical framework (determining 
factors generated at systemic level), the security threats and dilemmas for Moscow's 
policymakers and their impact on the country's external affairs will be determined. 
Through the lens of social constructivism, the impact of the Russian identity and 
historical background on Russia's foreign policy will be explored. Finally, I intend to 
test these theories for their usefulness in understanding and explaining recent major 
political actions carried out by Russia in its search for its place in the contemporary 
world. 
Since 1992, Russia has significantly changed its foreign policy. At the end of the 
1980s, the Kremlin, unable to compete with United States any longer, abandoned its 
traditional realist principles, namely security di! emma and balance of power that had 
been in place since antiquity. Through the adoption of a foreign po licy centered on 
liberalism and cooperation, Russia sought to facilitate the country's rapid integration 
with the West. This Russian pro-Western policy and Gorbatchev's "New Thinking" 
(1985) triggered the debate over the relevance of the realist theory among 
3 
international scholars in the 1990s. However, in this thesis, I will argue that 
irrelevance, or neo-realism, has been- to say the !east-premature. 
The first assumption of this thesis is that the negative outcome of Russia's 
adoption of the abovementioned liberal foreign policy in the early 1990s is the main 
cause of Russia's political return to the balance of power policies. Today, Russia's 
foreign policy is better understood through the theoretical lens of Waltz's structural 
realism. 
A central tenet of the neorealist paradigm is the assumption that the 
international politics of any state (actor) depend on the structural properties of an 
international system (Waltz, 1979). According to Waltz, the primary goal of any 
international actor is the survival of the state. Pursuant to this thinking, one can 
deduce that to preserve their sovereignty, international actors act rationally, primarily 
by following rules dictated by an anarchie self-help system. 
I will argue that Russia's decision to act otherwise, to abandon its traditional 
realist principles in 1992, is precisely what caused the country ' s economie and 
political decline paired with its security vulnerability from 1992 to 1995. In 
accordance with the neorealist concept of state power, the abovementioned decline 
must be understood as an unprecedented economie free-fall , Joss of control over 
many federal administrative subjects (1994 war in Chechnya), and disaster in the 
military, industrial, and other critical areas that are important to the state's power 
(Waltz, 1979). The vulnerability ofRussia's security during this period centers on the 
fact that NATO was still viewed by the Kremlin as a threat. This was largely due to 
the fact that NATO disregarded its previous promise to the Soviet Union to refrain 
from enlargement (1990) and instead decided to accept three new members from the 
Warsaw Pact (1997)2 (Primakov, 1999; Putin, 2006). 
2 Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland 
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Russia' s inability to rectify its newfound unfavorable position created security 
disadvantages for the country (Chapter I). It was therefore understood that the 
Russian international position would only worsen if the country continued along a 
liberal path. To ensure state sovereignty and to rectify the aforementioned 
misbalance, reverting back to balance of power policies (realism) emerged as the 
most rational option for Russia's policymakers. 
In 1996, Evgeny Primakov, the newly appointed Foreign Minister, re-defined 
Russian political priorities. Euro-Atlantic integration feil to the level ofless important 
concerns, while main accent became re-gaining the influence in post-Soviet republics, 
diversity in Foreign Affairs, and even counter-balancing the United States . Since 
these changes in foreign policy in sorne ways reflected a return to a Cold War 
mentality, Russia was criticized by the West as being old-fashioned. Nevertheless, 
directly in line with neorealist theory, this foreign policy shift ultimately afforded 
Moscow relative success in regaining sorne of its positions of strength in international 
affairs. A prime example of this reality is Russia's opposition to Ukrainian and 
Georgian MAP proposition in 2008 (Mankoff, 2009, Levesque, 2009). 
Starting from 1996, Russian foreign policy focused on counter-balancing the 
US. and the West. This focus changed under Putin's leadership between 2001 and 
2003 (after the events of 9111 and until the US. invasion of Iraq). Putin proposed 
Russia' s partnership with the US. so that they may fight together against the new 
types of global threats such as international terrorism. Putin's approach was 
pragmatic. On one ha~d, Russia was open to cooperation with the West, but only with 
reciprocal benefits. On the other hand, Russia weighted this stance equally with other 
options, namely Russia's partnership with the East (strategie cooperation with China, 
India and other Asian actors) and performing a leading role within CIS . This latter 
option indeed became a top priority for Russia, especially after the US. 's invasion of 
~--------- -~------------------------·-------------
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Iraq in 2003, the Color Revolutions" (2003-2004), and finally the US.'s active 
support for Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership in 2008 (Asmus, 2010; 
Mankoff, 2009). 
Consequent to these political policy shifts, the newly appointed President 
Dmitry Medvedev signed the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation4 in 
July of 2008 . This consolidated Russia's chosen political course. The document 
covers rather ambitious plans, including expanding its sphere of influence in the 
world, continuing a multidirectional policy in diplomatie relations, emphasizing 
bilateral relations with select EU members (thereby avoiding dealing with the 
institution itselt), placing CIS in the main regional priority, and opposing Ukrainian 
and Georgian NATO membership5. 
These official declarations found their practical implementation in a number 
0f foreign actions by the Russian Federation. One chain of events in 2008 is 
particularly illustrative of this fact Putin's forewarning of the negative impact of 
Kosovo's independence issué was followed by the war with Georgia, and 
subsequently the recognition of the separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Later in 
2009-2010, the Kremlin regained political influence in Ukraine. Together, these 
events completely eliminated further NATO membership perspectives for these two 
republics for sorne time (Levesque, 2009; Mankoff, 2009). 
The second assumption of this thesis is that the current foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation is largely shaped by the country's traditional national interests, 
which can be deduced from security dilemmas and realist notions of power. As will 
3 Namely 2003 in Georgia, 2004 in Ukraine, 2005 in Kyrgyzstan- ali former Soviet Republics 
4 Available in English at http://www.mid .ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/e2f289bea62097f9c325787a0034c255/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cddb!OpenDocu 
ment 
5 ln this official document, found on Russian Foreign Affairs official website, the text mentions ''[. .. ] 
negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, [ ... ]plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the 
membership [ ... )". 
6 Putin: "ln the end, this is a stick with two ends and that other end will come back to knock them on 
the head someday." - "Kosovo precedent 'terrifying': Putin" Associated Press, 22 February 2008 
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be illustrated, after Rus si a' s failed attempt to collaborate/cooperate with the West, the 
"old-school" priorities that were adopted by Primakov's cabinet were shaped by 
traditional security threats, such as state integrity, keeping potential enemies away 
from national borders, economie prosperity, and keeping political eggs in different 
baskets. Later, Putin and Medvedev did not significantly alter the core content of 
these national interests. In addition, Waltz's so-called ingredients for power (Waltz, 
1979: 106)7 were taken into consideration by the actual Russian political elite, aiming 
to restore Russia toits the traditionallevel ofWorld's great power. 
My third assumption is that, at present, Moscow is leaning toward asserting 
itself as a regional hegemon over the former Soviet territory rather than favor 
alliances with the Western or Eastern powers. This assumption is founded on the 
premise that Russia's alliances with the West (United States and European Union) or 
East (China) are characterized by geopolitical limitations and, as such, do not have 
long-run reliable perspectives. Russia' s interests in establishing relations with 
Europe, the United States, China, or India in particular are mostly pragmatic in 
character; they center on economie gains and favorable shifts in the international 
balance of power. However, these relations in practice are both limited and 
contradictory. 
From a strategie and geopolitical standpoint, Russia percetves the West 
through the prism ofNATO, in which the United States plays a leading role. NATO's 
policy of enlargement through the acceptance of former Soviet republics, which is 
largely backed by the United States, has for the last 10 to 15 years created tensions 
and limitations in Moscow' s relations with Brussels and Washington. The Kremlin 
has on multiple occasions declared its strong opposition to the Alliance's enlargement 
policy, but these declarations were largely ignored, and the Alliance's troops closely 
approached the Russian border. 
7 II.Jamelv: size of the population, natural resources, and military and economie power, political 
stability and competence (discussed in detail in Chapter 1). 
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Furthermore, Russia continuously seeks equal partnership with the United 
States and the European Union through their recognition ofMoscow's dominant role 
in the former Soviet Union. This, however, contradicts the Euro-Atlantic interests in 
the region, which aims for former Soviet Republics to be Jess dependent on Russia 
and more integrated with the West. Similarly, Russia's relations with China and 
India, although often mutually beneficiai , have significant limitations as weil. 
Because Russia's relations with Beijing on security, trade, and energy issues largely 
exceed its cooperation with New Delhi, only China's case will be considered for 
further analysis. 
~ot only common borders, but also common interests between Russia and 
China lay the foundation of the relationship between these two countries. For one, 
bath countries want the world to be multipolar and, accordingly, contest US 
hegemony . They also bath seek to obtain enhanced economie cooperation, 
particularly with respect to energy. In regard to military cooperation, their interests 
are bath rooted in security issues within the Security Cooperation Organization 
(SCO). Furthermore, bath countries oppose separatism, and China recognizes 
Moscow's traditional role of supremacy in the post-Soviet region, including Central 
Asia. 
Despite these commonalities, Russia's relationship with China has significant 
limitations. For one, Moscow's energy policy significantly limits China's access to 
Russia's resources, to which Beijing cannat turn a blind eye (Lo, 2008). There are 
also sorne contradictions, or at !east misunderstandings, between the two countries 
regarding their security cooperation within the seo and in their relations with the 
United States. Moreover, the fact that China did not recognize South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia' s independence in 2008 further reinforces the limitations of their poli ti cal 
partnership. I intend to further examine these limitations in my research. 
Ali this in my opinion, will force Russia to take a very careful and calculated 
position in regard to its Eastern neighbor, with whom it shares five thousands 
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kilometers of borders filled with potential security 1ssues. As argued by Russian 
foreign po licy experts, Rus si a' s internai poli ti cal structure has a direct impact on its 
external affairs. In line with other scholars who believe that Waltz's theory is missing 
a domestic element, in my analysis, I strive to emphasize the importance of Russian 
internai processes, the division of its political elite, and the role of its identity in the 
country's foreign policy. 
Russia stands in contrast to the mature powers that have had long-standing 
stable courses oftheir internai and external policies. Russian foreign policy cannet be 
reduced to questions of power and tradition. In particular, Russian identity and the 
way Russia sees itself in regard to the rest of the world should be carefully analyzed. 
The way Russians, or rather the political elite, identify themselves presents valuable 
pieces of information that need be taken into account. 
Sorne Russian political leaders, such as Gorbatchev and Kozyrev, represent 
the westernizers (Hopf, 1999; Tsygankov, 2006), whose stance can be tied to 
principles of European poli ti cal economie mode!. This group sees the achievement of 
democratie values and integration with the West as its ultimate political goals. The 
other two types of political elites in Russia, statists and civilizationists, have their 
own different perceptions, which center primarily on notions of Great Power. The 
way that these respective perceptions and according priorities impact the greater 
course of Russian foreign policy constitutes the core of the final chapter of my thesis. 
Social constructivism proposes an alternative approach for analyzing Russian 
foreign policy. It brings us to the leve! of identity and historical continuity. This in 
turn helps scholars to better understand the Kremlin's decision-making process. This 
theoretical paradigm offers a comprehensive portrait of Russian foreign policy and 
the opportunity to better identify its main characteristics, as declared at the outsets of 
this thesis. 
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b. Methodology and Organization of Content 
This thesis will utilize qualitative research derived from severa) case studies, 
in aâdition to analytical deduction of collected data in my conclusions. 
I will first introduce the reader to the problematique and research questions 
related to Russia' s foreign policy priori ti es and its ambitious quest for a relevant 
place in the new multipolar world. I will then use the neorealist theoretical framework 
to determine the factors at the structural level that influence the Kremlin's political 
behavior and the country's priorities at the regional and global scale, the latter of 
which are shaped largely by the country's security dilemmas in dealing with West 
and East. 
Taking into account realist assumptions, I intend to subsequently examine two 
case studies. The first case study explores Rus si a' s foreign po licy towards NATO 
enlargement, which is believed to best reflect Russian-Western relations at the 
structural level. It will be argued that Russia's foreign policy towards NATO 
enlargement involves many realist issues su ch as security dilemma, balance of power, 
and elements of survival, amongst severa) others. It will also be argued to involve 
multiple political and security issues over the Euro-Atlantic space, such as the 
bombing of Yugoslavia, Kosovo's independence, and Russian-Georgian fallout in 
2008. 
The second case study examines Russia's political relations with China. Here, 
I limit myself mostly to Russia's political cooperation with China within SCO, as 
weil including energy . Security and energy dimensions will be argued to have 
particularly large repercussions on the international scale and best demonstrate power 
relations from a realist point of view. Moreover, China-Russian relations are more 
significant at internationallevel in comparison to other Asian countries, such as India, 
Iran and Japan. 
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The social constructivist paradigm will then be used to examine Russian 
foreign policy from an alternate perspective, with the intention to complement the 
"dryness" and pragmatism of realism. My purpose is not to test these theories but 
rather to better understand Russia' s poli ti cal direction. Social constructivism here is 
aimed foremost to introduce the reader to Russia's political particularities, the 
importance of its internai variables (such as the divergent visions of foreign policy 
and interpretations of democracy among the political elite), the role of identity and 
how all of the aforementioned influence the Kremlin's foreign policy. 
By completing the above, the direction and priorities of Moscow's foreign 
policy and the place that Russia is most likely to hold in the changing world can be 
determined. 
In summary, four chapters and a conclusion will be used to present the results 
of my research. The introduction will reveal the problematique and methodology of 
this thesis. The first chapter will recapitulate neorealist principles and its relevance in 
examining Russia's foreign policy. The second chapter will examine Russia's policy 
of opposition to NATO enlargement, which epitomizes Russia-West relations. The 
third chapter, named "Sino-Russian relations: security and energy dimensions", will 
be divided in two logical parts: security and energy. The forth chapter will cover 
elements of social constructivism in order to complement neorealist limitations, 
which, again, is intended to explain Russia's internai particularities that influence its 
foreign policy. As previously mentioned, the conclusion is intended to synthesize the 
main priori ti es and directions of Rus si a' s foreign policy in the aim of ascertaining its 
place in the multipolar world. 
c. Sources 
In order to achieve my ambitious goals I will be using various sources and 
empirical data. The theoretical component of this thesis will be based on the ciass1c 
"--------·---· - ---------------------------------------
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works of Waltz, H.E. Carr, Rose, Schweller, Wendt, and other theorists, as well the 
cri ti cal papers of severa! IR scholars, such as Keohane, Krasner, and Mershaimer. 
Thanks to the good fortune of my bilingualism in Russian and English, the case 
studies that will be explored in this thesis will be a combination of printed sources in 
bath ofthese languages. This is especially beneficiai, as the two often offer opposing 
perspectives . 
Case studies written in English include the related works of Hopf, Tsygankov, 
Lo, and Mankoff, amongst others. Other sources written in English comprise articles 
by IR scholars related to specifie tapies (such as SCO cooperation, New global arder, 
etc) derived from the University database and seminars readings. 
Works written in Russian include those of political scholars and important 
policymakers in Russia, such as Tsygankov, Arbatov, Primakov, Kozyrev, and 
Lavrov. Official documents on Russian foreign policy, the EU commission on the 
Russian-Georgian war in 2008, SCO declaration and the minutes of official foreign 
visits ali originally written in Russian will also be used. 
Furthermore, traditional Russian mass media sources will be integrated into 
this paper. The ai rn of so doing is primarily for data collection and/or cases wherein I 
strive to illustrate Russian propaganda. 
CHAPTER 1. WALZ'S NEOREALIST THEORY AND IDENTIFYING RUSSIA'S 
SECURITY THREA TS 
This chapter aims to outline the factors that influence Russian foreign policy 
at the leve! of the international system, primarily through the use of the neorealist 
theoretical paradigm. 
This paper's first assumption is that Russia's international behavior can be 
better explained and to a certain extent forecasted using the core principles ofWaltz's 
structural realism. A central postulate of neorealism is that the international politics 
of any state depend on the structural properties of the international system (Waltz, 
1979). An analysis of a country's foreign policy conducted through the lens of 
neorealism thus involves full independence from other variables such as the country's 
internai policy or structure, historical background and role of certain political 
personalities. 
I found this type of analysis to be very useful when looking at Russia's 
foreign policy. It enables the examination of particular mechanisms and variables of 
international politics, such as international structure and security dilemma, and helps 
one understand the limitations of cooperation among main actors (states). 
I would, however, have to agree to a certain extent with other realist scholars, 
such as Schweller, Rose and Zakharia, who criticize this paradigm for being too 
distant from real politics. In the case of Russia's foreign policy, the use of strictly 
Waltz's theory severely limits the ability to achieve this paper's secondary objective: 
to ascertain a complete picture of Russia's foreign policy, which inevitably involves 
lower levels of analysis. 
Consequent to the fact that no single theory of international politics accounts 
for alllevels of analysis with a sufficient degree of detail, I have decided to combine 
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two theories to grasp a full understanding of Russia's contemporary foreign policy, 
foreign relations, and place in the mu! ti polar world. 
The neorealist paradigm will be used to determine the factors and variables 
that influence Russian politics at the systemic level. Structural realism offers a 
relatively impartial view and ontology, as it distinguishes itself from the 
unpredictability of human nature and idealism, culture and historical influence. In 
particular, it is with the help ofneorealism that I intend to determine Russia's security 
dilemma, its external threats, and the role of the state' s power and of its resources. 
Social constructivism will, alternately, serve as a lens of examination for 
variables related to Russia's domestic particularities and mechanisms of political 
decision-making. This paradigm allows us to delve deeper into our analysis of 
Russia' s foreign policy and foreign relations, namely by affording a particular focus 
on state and person, where the role of history and identity are pivotai. This theory 
thereby provides us with other relevant details and explanations asto why states react 
differently to similar systemic factors . 
This combined theoretical approach of neorealism and social constructivism is 
believed to offer a most holistic understanding of occurrences past and present that 
have together shaped Russia's contemporary place in the multipolar world. 
1.1 Waltz's Structural realism 
This section will discuss the main assumptions of Waltz's theory of structural 
realism. More specifically, it will answer in detail two main questions related to this 
papers use of the neorealist paradigm: 
Why was realism selected as a lens of analysis as opposed to other theoretical 
paradigms? 
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Why was Waltz's neorealist theory selected for the first portion of this paper, 
among the multitude of other streams of realism? 
First and foremost, structural realism is not only the most popular theory but also 
one that has remained highly relevant over time. While the theory may be thirty three 
years old (in 2012) it remains amongst the most referenced in international politics 
toda y. 
Neorealism 1s particularly useful for our analysis, as it offers an objective 
perspective for the examination of international poli tics. Other competitive theoretical 
frameworks, such as liberalism, poststructuralism, and post positivism, for example, 
are oflesser value to the Russian case. Liberalism, neorealism's main competitor, for 
example, places an exceeding focus on the supremacy of international institutions and 
their regulating capacity. The cases of the U. S' s bombing of Iraq (1997) and Serbia 
(1999), and invasion of Iraq (2003), wherein Washington acted unilaterally despite 
the objections of international institutions, namely the U.N. Security Council, 
together illustrate the shortcomings of this theory. 
On the flip side, these cases support Waltz's neorealist theory, which is founded 
upon the following assumptions: the international system is anarchie (there is a lack 
of supreme power to rule over states), the main drive behind the actions of the state is 
survival (the preservation of state sovereignty), states act according to the logic of 
self-help (states seek to maximize their utility (power)), and the uneven distribution 
of power leads to the creation of alliances and bandwagoning (balance of power). 
Waltz also contends that the power of the state is dependent on the resources it 
possesses, namely its population, natural resources, and military and economie 
power, combined with its skillful management of these "commodities" (Waltz 1979: 
1 06). The lack of supreme power, which would serve as the role of global policemen 
or judge to regulate relations among states, creates insecurity and mistrust among 
states. This Jack of trust is also consequent to the fact that states cannat predict the 
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future intentions of other states. Waltz argues that states are thus forced to ensure 
their survival through external or internai balancing. The former involves the creation 
of alliances with other states, while the latter involves the growth of a state' s own 
"commodities"; maximizing its power through use or growth of its available 
resources. The growth of the power of one state renders its competitors insecure, 
thereby forcing them to react to and to compensate for the created misbalance. 
Mistrust among states, fueled with the uncertainty of competitors' intentions, leads to 
what has been coined the security dilemma (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978). 
These variables and factors offer quite clear and simple explanations as to why 
states attack one another, compete for power, and form alliances. A statement made 
by H.E. Carr (1963: 111) regarding the relations Japan's bombing of the Russian fleet 
in the Pacifie in 1905 underscores the impact of the security dilemma on international 
policy: 
"It was clearly an act of aggression from a teclmical point of view, but, politically 
speaking it was an act caused by the aggressive policy of Tsarist Government 
towards Japan, who, in order to forestall the danger, struck the first blow at the 
adversary. " 
History is full of similar examples as such, including the competition that 
existed between Sparta and Athens (Thucydides), the two world wars and many 
others. Together, these serve as brilliant illustrations of Waltz's assumptions about 
the security dilemma, balance of power theory and the instability of a multipolar or 
unipolar system (Waltz, 1979:163-170). 
But as we may see, neorealism offers only a general and relatively impartial 
framework; it neglects to cover other important details such as internai political 
structure. In the case of Russia, for example, its limited scope of analysis offers 
highly simplistic answers for the following questions : 
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Why did the Soviet Union abandoned its zero sum game in the 1980's and has 
since chosen to open up the country toits adversary (the U.S.A.), as weil asto 
embrace democratie change in the 1990s? 
Why has USSR rejected the idea of global confrontation or alliances with 
ether actors to compensate for its economie decline in the 1980s? 
Realists would forward the reductionist explanation that the USSR's decision to 
soften its ideologicalline and to ally itself with the West (1980s and 1990s) resulted 
from the exhaustion of its resources . However, Russia's complex case makes evident 
that it is far too simplistic to limit one's understanding of an actor's decision making 
strictly to notions of "bandwagoning". So doing certainly omits the important role of 
domestic factors. For example, in the case of the USSR, those factors would be the 
structure of the political elite and its historicallegacy. 
While severa! ether streams of realism preserve the core elements of the theory, 
they differ in their leve) of analysis or/and consideration of ether variables. It is 
precisely on this premise that the central criticism of neorealism arises. 
1.2 Criticism ofNeorealism 
As aforementioned, Waltz's neorealist theory strives to explain the conditions 
that give rise to global and inter-state wars, the principles of forming alliances, and 
the ways in which international structure influences world politics. As was also 
previously mentioned, this framework fails to account for particular situations, and to 
give insight as to when and how certain actors will act. To compensate for its isolated 
level ofanalysis, Waltz accordingly proposed that neorealism's focus on international 
politics be compensated through the examination of another 'science'- foreign policy 
(1996). 
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Not all realists, however, agree with this contention. One opponent in 
particular, Gideon Rose, proposed that realist theory ought to be perceived as a 
composite whole; without its division into parts (classical realism, neorealism). The 
main argument of his work (Neoclassical Realism, 1998) is that systemic parameters 
influence international politics but to a lesser degree than neorealists contend and that 
the importance of domestic variables need be taken into account in the analysis. Rose 
forwards a stream of realism, known as 'neoclassical realism', that asserts that a 
state' s domestic attributes, such as its skillful management of resources and internai 
politics, are equally as influential on foreign policy as is the international structure. 
Accordingly, he contests neorealism's limiting, simplistic notion that the state's main 
goal is one of survival (1998: 146). Rose founds his position on the works of other 
scholars, namely Zakharia (1998), Schweller (1998), and Christensen (1996) who 
also take factors like a country's tradition, place in international politics and history 
into account. This recently popularized paradigm has largely been criticized for the 
Jack of clarity of its central assumption. For example, while neoclassical realists 
contend that "domestic politics is a key for understanding state behavior, they do not 
share an integrative framework for analyzing the actual process through which states 
formulate and implement policies."8 
Michael Spirtas (A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory, 1999) 
offers another critique of Waltz ' s theory . He proposed a fusion of Waltz's 
neorealism and Morgenthau's classical realism but with a division in the leve! of 
analysis between systemic and elemental. Through this trying to achieve complete 
grasp of complex international poli tics (Spirtas 1999: 385-424). 
Other types and variations of realism, namely defensive and offensive 
realism9, would have very little value for the thesis since they do not explain Russia 
8 Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Edited by Steven E. Lobe li, Norrin M . Ripsman, 
and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
9 Define Defensive and offensive realism and main theorists-- works of Modelsky's long cycles, etc 
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foreign policy to the same extent as do neorealism and social constructivism. It is for 
this reason that they are neither considered for our analysis. Instead of exploring other 
variables like domestic policy, history, and human nature through another stream of 
realism, this paper will instead use social construcitivsm to achieve this end. 
Taking the above into account, I conclude that neorealism, being relatively 
impartial and affording an abstract perspective, is best suited to cover the top tier of 
our anal y sis of Russia' s foreign policy, specifically at the leve! of the international 
system, in which elements of international structure play the central role. 
1.3 Applying Neorealist Principles to Russian Case 
From the outset, I will apply Waltz's assumptions directly to Russia's case; 
the Russian Federation is an actor on the international political stage and it does not 
have any other supreme power above itself. The same situation is valid for other 
actors with whom Russia interacts. One may argue that international institutions, such 
as the United Nations and its Security Council, are supposed to regulate the security 
aspect of the world's anarchie environment. However, in accordance with the realist 
perspective, institutions in actuality do not constitute the superior component of the 
international system. Rather, they serve as vehicles for cooperation among actors and 
the expansion of states' own national interests (Mearshaimer, 1994; Waltz, 1979). 
Let us recall that neorealism contends that state survival is the fundamental 
goal and priority of any actor and its policy. While it is evidently not the state' s only 
goal , it is its most fundamental. Accordingly, the state is said to react to any danger 
and/or risk that threatens its existence and sovereignty. Of course when security 
guarantees are achieved, others goals come into play as well. Whenever the security 
balance is affected, however, actors are said to immediately start striving for their 
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survival. The following brief examples of the European Union and NATO members' 
behavior are particularly illustrative of this contention. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed the greatest security threat to 
European countries (NATO members). In order to address the European security 
dilemma, European countries' alliance with the United States and the admittance of 
US. troops into their lands emerged as the most rational solution. The US. 
guaranteed security for NATO members (through Article 5)10 while also ensuring 
strategie positions for its own security from the USSR in so doing. As a result oftheir 
alliance with the US., European countries found themselves in a markedly more 
secure space in the period 1980 - 1990 than they had during previous decades. In 
accordance with this fact, military spending was reduced (Table 1) and cooperation 
within the EU increased. As demonstrated by this increased cooperation within the 
EU, actors for whom the security dilemma is no longer a top priority are willing to 
give up bits oftheir independence in order to profit from absolute (cooperative) gains 
(Keohane, 1984, Nye, 1994)u. 
That being said, if at any point the security balance is affected, one can 
observe that state survival at any cost immediately re-emerges as a top priority for 
any acter in the international structure. For example, during the 2008 economie 
recession, many states, such as Germany, France and the UK, ignored the EU's free-
trade policy and instead increased their customs tariffs. This was primarily aimed to 
keep foreign companies out of their economies, thereby protecting their local 
producers. 
Similarly, the Gas Pipeline Agreement between Germany and Russia (North 
Stream, 2006) polarized the EU due to active Polish and Baltic protests against the 
resurgence of 'Big Power' domination (Wist, 2008). Here, Poland and Baltic 
10 ln ac~ordance with which ali Allias must engage if any of the me rn bers is un der attack. 
11 As weil in details see Keohane's: «Governance in a Particulary Globalized World», 2002. 
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countries found themselves in a position of security vulnerability, which forced them 
to react in a way that would restore their prior state of security (namely protesting). 
Both of the abovementioned cases make evident that the moment that 
economie prosperity or national security are in danger, pre-establi shed agreements 
between European countries and the EU take a secondary role to national self-
interests. In accordance with Waltz' s theory of balance of power, the growth in power 
of other competitors (states or alliance of states) creates a security dilemma that is 
responded to with states ' prioritization of their survival (Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 
1963). 
In Russia' s case, in 1992 the US. and NATO members promised Moscow' s 
policymakers economie assistance and security guarantees (Primakov, 1999:96). 1 
will forward the argument that the West's promises and its possession of a certain 
degree of parity in nuclear arsenal together created the illusion of security for Russia 
and temporarily eliminated the country ' s security dilemma. Furthermore, this sense of 
security, in turn, allowed for the prevalence of other political goals . Moscow's top 
priority became rapid western integration (Kozyrev, 1992), the so-called "Kozyrev 
Doctrine" . The other central concerns of the Kremlin ' s policymakers included 
economie prosperity and Russia' s obtainment of strategie gains through its 
cooperation with the most developed countries. Meanwhile, presence in the CIS space 
and diplomatie relations with other states became second in priority. 
However, shortly thereafter, Russia' s sense of security v ani shed. Russia found 
itself in a very miserable and unfavorable position: 
"The country's frontiers were pushed back farther than they had been since the 
seventeenth century, while the once-mighty Red Army (Soviet) simply collapsed. 
And then Russia was no longer feared, it was no longer accorded the respect given to 
major powers. Its objections were ignored as NATO moved to take in its closest 
neighbors. Even pieces of the former Soviet union began freeing themselves from the 
Russian yoke." (Mankoff 2009:2) 
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In the absence of a true alliance with the West, Russia was confronted with a 
multitude of internai and externai probiems. The long list of external problems 
includes security threats generated by a destabilized situation in the former soviet 
republics, and military conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Tajikistan. Amongst the many internai crises, there existed severe tensions in 
Chechnya, Dagestan and other federal subjects, which challenged the central role of 
the state. The Russian armed forces demonstrated their incompetence most notably 
through their inability to adapt their tactics to different types of conflicts in the 
Chechen conflict (1994-1995). On top of this, Russia' s most important revenue 
branches, namely the gas and oil industries, brought profits to tycoons as opposed to 
the state. Overall, the economie situation became catastrophic by the mid- and late-
1990s. 
In the external realm, Russia !ost most of its poli ti cal power. A primary source 
for this Joss was NATO's active engagement of most of the former communist 
republics through the Partnership for Peace Project12 (launched in 1994). The PfF's 
main objective de facto became to prepare candidates for NATO membership13 
Three former Warsaw Pact members: Pol and, Hungary and Czech Republic opted for 
NATO membership at this time, while Russia could not influence this outcome (in 
more details in Chapter 2) . 
As assumed by realist princip! es and the structure of international politics, one 
actor will not encourage or support its competitor to grow in power but will instead 
take advantage of other's weakness(es). Neorealism and its structure of international 
politics would presume that one state would on! y help another if it is in line with its 
own national interests and the balance of power. In ali other cases, cooperation is said 
12 More details are found on www.nato.int/pfp 
13 This objective is not officially declared as the main but the energy and political will invested (by the 
USA) in this project reveal it as clear, as welllooking through realism lens. 
-- - --------- -----------------------------------
22 
to be limited by the security dilemma and other systemic factors (Waltz, 1979:105-
106). 
The Russia-West case in the 1990s is sound example of this. The West's 
enthusiasm to support Russia's promotion of democratie values should be understood 
as being truly pragmatic in nature. In line with the West's own national interests, by 
becoming more democratie, Russia was believed to become more secured and 
transparent, conformed to the rules and policy of the international liberal institutions 
(the UN, European Council, WTO, etc.) and, in this way, eliminating security 
threats which communist or imperialistic Russia used to generate. By the same token, 
the West did not seek to excessively weaken Russia, which would be in itself 
problematic and irrational. A destabilized and divided Russia would introduce an 
immense, unsecured area next to EU borders with many implied consequences 
(uncontrolled nuclear arsenal, arms smuggling, demographie issues, unsecured energy 
supplies, etc). 
The introduction of American economie advisors to Russia was likewise also 
conducted out of the West's own national interests. While the West did not strive to 
completely destroy Russian or divide the country, their investments were minimal 
while the expectation of Russia's output was anticipated to be maximal (Primakov, 
2011 :73). Russian oil and gas fields were placed large! y under the control of Western 
companies (BP, Exxon mobil, etc.), not for Russia's benefit, but rather for the 
extraction ofmuch of the country's oil for American and European export. 
The West also actively engaged former Soviet allies through European and 
NATO institutions in an effort to distance them from the Kremlin's sphere of 
influence. Russia would ultimately not be delivered the promised help and assistance 
ofthe West (Primakov, 1999:98; 2011:73-74). 
Conversely, Russia was perceived as the West's competitor. In 1992, despite its 
proclaimed pro-western policy, Russia was still not a friend of the West. 1 would 
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argue that the West's competitive stance at this time was consequent to the following 
three central factors : 
Russia was the only country with nuclear parity at a strategie leve! with 
NATO. More generally, Russia held, and continues to hold, aggressive 
politics, due to its imperialistic vision towards former communist countries, 
which necessitates its treatment by the West as a potential security threat. 
Europe became dependent upon Russian fossil commodities since the 1980s 
due the untenable growth of its economy. Furtherrnore, Russia under Putin 
started using this dependence as its bargaining power to achieve its political 
goals. 
Economie competition between Russia and the West in general , with 
particular emphasis on arms sales, has put the two severely at odds since the 
Cold War. Russia is one of the world's main armament suppliers today and 
has been since 1992. Among its major customers are Asian countries like 
India and China that are especially viable customers because of the great 
demand that they represent. This reality inevitably overlaps with and 
challenges American political and economie interests (Primakov, 1999: 163). 
By the mid-1990s, Russian leaders began realizing that the rules of the political 
game, inspired by realism, had not altered much since the Cold War. 
Consistent with Waltz's neorealist principles, Russia subsequently "naturally" acted 
in a self-help system in accordance with its own selfish interests and possessed power 
(capability) (Waltz, 1979: 131; lli, 2010). 
At the structural leve!, the biggest challenges that Russia was faced with were: 
NATO's plans to enlarge closer toits borders; the loss of its influence among former 
communist allies, and the lack of Western reciprocity with respect to its decision to 
become a true ally of the West. This grim dynamic, combined with Russia's own 
internai problems (described above), led the Kremlin to foresee future dilemmas for 
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Russia and brought into question Russia's continued existence in the international 
arena (due to fast and stable decline). If we take a look at later minister Kozyrev's 
declaration about Russian priorities, we can see that previous idealistic visions had 
yielded to "traditional" Russian interests, namely CIS space and Russian security 
(Levesque14, 201 0). At first, in Kozyrev' s scandalous speech at the European Council 
in 1992 (which was not published but presented as misunderstanding) would describe 
what Russia's foreign policy might look like in spite of the lack of democratie 
support from the West and disregard for Russia's interests 
Russia's pragmatic and realist calculations, dictated by the state's primary 
mission - survival -, started to dominate the Kremlin's foreign politics in 1996. 
Russia's national interests and the country's need to oppose security threats again 
resurged as top priori ti es. At this ti me, the new Minister of foreign affairs and former 
chief of Foreign Intelligence Agency, Evgeny Primakov, redefined Moscow's 
political priorities, thereby changing the vector ofits cabinet back to "cold peace" 15 
Primakov listed the following as the priori ti es of his cabinet: building the integrity of 
the Russian state; establishing "central" relations with CIS and playing the prime role 
within it; stabilizing of the former Soviet region; restricting the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; emphasizing Russian national interests (including the 
export of hydra carbonates as the key to sustainable successful economy) and 
unifying Georgia (1999: 218-219). Primakov also identified NATO's enlargement 
policy, by accepting former Soviet allies, as a threat to Russia's geopolitical situation. 
Upon review of this list, one can note the substitution of idealistic goals for 
pragmatic ones. This decision has, again, been dictated by factors such as the security 
dilemma, the country' s potential threats, national interests and its quest to restore 
state power. 
14 Russian Foreign policy on CIS space. Political Science Seminar in UQAM in 2010 
15 http:l/articles.latimes.com/1994-12-06/news/mn-5629 1 cold-war 
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Let us now look at Russia's re-defined political aims through the realist lens 
and juxtapose the same with Russia's actual political actions. NATO and its plans to 
expand to the East, which threatened Russia' s balance of power, led Moscow to react 
by actively trying to ally itselfwith China, India and other Asian powers. In so doing, 
it sought to compensate for the created misbalance. Primakov coined this project 
"Triangle: Russia-China-India" (1999: 197). In 1999, Russia and China together 
created the Shanghai Five, an organization aimed to counterbalance the American 
presence in Central Asia. While the former, the "Triangle" was rather unsuccessful, 
the efforts of the Shanghai Five resulted in relative effectiveness, by keeping the US. 
out ofUzbekistan in 2006 (to be explored at greater length in Chapter 3). 
Russia's political actions would also be shaped by its newfound vision of 
being situated in a world marked by a new world order; a Twenty-first century 
multipolarity. In his book (2009), Primakov highlights the fact that while the US. 
remained the unchallenged world super-power it was unable to control the entire 
globe. The end of the Cold War, and the rise of rapidly developing countries and 
regions like China, the Asian-Pacific, and Latin America, together served to reduce 
global economie and poli ti cal dependence on the US. thus illustrating Primakov' s 
assertion (Haas, 2008; Primakov 1999: 209). This reality served to inspire Moscow's 
policymakers to promote multipolarity through its political agenda, such as by 
expanding G-8 to G-20. Russia's ultimate goal in so doing would be to carve its own 
central place in the world. Moscow' s aspired sphere of influence would of course 
largely be concentrated on the geopolitical area of the former Soviet Union and its 
allies. 
The former Soviet republics represent Russia's major geopolitical interests for 
multiple reasons. From the neorealist perspective, the territory of the Ex-USSR 
comprises vital security, strategy and resource assets for Russia. This is closely 
interconnected to the state's security and the "commodities" that contribute to its 
power. Ukraine, for example, borders the Black Sea from its West coast, and thus 
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provides Russia with a strategie base for its naval fleet. Both Ukraine and 
Byelorussia's territories also host major gas and oïl transit pipelines to Europe. 
Additionally, both represent important Slavic population reserves (totaling 
approximately fifty million people) that are beneficiai for Russia's decreasing 
demographies. 
Other countries, like Kazakhstan, off er strategie bases for Russia' s space 
missions. Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
also possess important gas, oil and uranium reserves, over which Russia tries to keep 
a monopoly so as to maintain stable priees on the international market and eliminate 
concurrency. Georgia offers important strategie access to the Black Sea and to the 
Caucasus, which promises the hosting of a pipeline, Nabucco (Lukas, 2008; map 1.1 ), 
aimed to diversify European energy supplies and reduce European dependence on 
Russia (more details on this topic will be provided in Chapters 2 and 4). Furthermore, 
ali ex-Soviet republics represent a valuable security buffer zone for Russia from 
potential hostile actors, such as the NATO bloc, as well as a strategie base for the 
Russian military (Table 2). 
At present, most ofthese republics, with the exception of the Baltic States, are 
ali members of the Commonwealth of ln dependent States (CIS) wherein Russia has a 
leading role and intends to intensify its cooperation (for further discussion in Chapter 
4). 
Russia's intention to expand its power in the region displays a clear alignment 
with the neorealist paradigm. One recalls that, in the realist world, power is of the 
greatest importance for the state' s fulfillment of its goals and the defense of its 
sovereignty. In the beginning of the 1990s, Russia, in a state of weakness, had no 
means to influence international politics and defend its interests. Examples extracted 
from the 1990s support this argument. Russian national interests were largely ignored 
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it the following cases : NATO enlargement and Serbia bombing in 1999, Iraq 
bombing in 1997, US unilateral decision to leave ABN treaty and others. 
In order for Russian leaders to expand the country's power, they would have 
to consider the country's resources. As broken down by Waltz in his neorealist 
theory, a country's power depends on: "size of population and territory, resource 
endowment, economie capability, military strength, political stability and 
competence" (Waltz 1979: 131). 
By taking a close look at Russia's case, it becomes strikingly evident that 
Russia strove to maximize its power through the maximization of its resources, 
precisely as was argued by Waltz. 
Size of population and terri tory 
Russia has the world's largest territory and Europe's largest population. The 
demographie situation in Russia nevertheless raises grave concerns for Moscow's 
leaders. These concerns include major issues such as the ratio of territory to 
population, the population's quality of life, internai migrations from East to West, 
illegal immigration, and emigration. Mter the Soviet Union's collapse (1991), the 
Russian population has been in constant decrease. Under Putin's presidency severa! 
major initiatives for the achievement of demographie stabilization were launched. 
These included the provision of financial support to families with children, the 
promotion of healthy lifestyles and "Inducing immigration of compatriots", which 
was designed to stimulate Russian labor emigration from former Soviet republics 
(Kumo, 2010). Russia continues to experience serious falls in demographies, but for 
the moment the situation is less dramatic compared to the 1990s. 
Resource endowment and Economie capability 
Much like the political priorities defined by Primakov, Putin identified natural 
resources, particularly gas and oil, as central to Russia's economy from the outset of 
28 
his presidency. Accordingly, Putin capitalized on the high market priee of gas and oil 
to restore power to Russia' s economy (Lukas, 2008; Mankoff, 2009). These high 
market priees brought Russia immense revenues, which served to stimulate the 
countries economie growth. More specifically, they enabled Moscow to pay out its 
external debts and create financial reserves to reduce the impact of economie crises 
(Mankoff, 2009). 
The role of natural resources in Russia at this time was not only economie but 
also served as a strong political tool for Putin. During Putin' s first term (2000-2004), 
most private owners of hydro carbonate commodities in Russia (including foreign 
and local investors) were forced to sell their assets back to the State. In 2006, the 
Kremlin started to use the energy dependence of its customers (Moldova, Ukraine, 
and Georgia) for the achievement of its political goals in an unprecedented fashion. 
Essentially, by blackmailing these countries with high gas priees, Russia was quite 
suceessful to forestall Ukraine and Moldova from carrying out their Western 
aspirations, and to make th ose republics to fall back under Moscow' s poli ti cal 
umbrella. Russia also uses its oil and gas resourees as a bargaining political tool with 
the West, as well as the East (China, Chapter 3) and as mentioned with other former 
Soviet republics. This phenomena is called "Russian pipeline diplomacy" (Lukas, 
2008; Hinski , 2009). 
Military strength 
Prior to 2005, Russian armed forces suffered a considerable economie and 
technological crisi s due to its limited fi nancial resourees in 1990. Since 2005, Putin 
started sorne initiatives to revive the country's military . Amongst these initiatives 
were, for example, new armament procurement, which was aimed primarily at 
restoring Rus si a' s strategie military capability. In or der to achieve this goal, Russia 
increased its military spending and made efforts to replace its obsolete military 
equipment with new airplanes, helicopters, tanks, air-defense artillery and even 4th 
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generation aircraft fighters between 2005 and 2010. However, as it may be deduced 
from official declarations and political internai actions, Russia did not intend to 
participate in full-scale military engagements16. 
While it is no secret that Russia, compared on a conventional scale, is at 
present, no match to the Alliance, it military strength continues to exceed its 
neighbors from the ex-USSR. As argued by Gillpin, and liberal scholars more 
generally, a country's economie power is in the twenty-first century, far more 
influential in shaping the degree of its power, than is its strict military capacity 
(Gilpin, 1994). This fact was acknowledged by Russian leaders and thus explains 
Moscow's prioritization of its economie interests, despite having evidently made 
investments in its military strength. 
Political stability and competence 
A country's political stability and the stability of its political course in 
international affairs comprise the main credo ofPutin's team for the last twelve years . 
Periods of instability and insecurity, economie shocks and changing priorities in 
external affairs have exhausted Rus si a' s population and create a negative attitude 
towards West. Putin has performed enormous work to return the population' s 
confidence in the Russian state and to achieve contemporary Russia successes. 
Putin took Russia's problems and !essons learnt from the 1990s into political 
account. Ail of Russia' s potential internai threats were eliminated during his 
presidency (2000-2008) through various mechanisms, such as "democratie 
sovereignty" and building "power vertical" (Mankoff, 2009; Chapter IV). The latter 
resulted in raising the election thread from 4% to 7%, which was unattainable for the 
Russian pro-Western parties. Moreover, the heads of Russian regions (federal 
administrative units) are no longer elected but appointed by the President. Even with 
16 S. lvanov: «Russia has no political or military enemies», quote from Munich Security Conference in 
2007. 
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the results ofDuma's recent election (2011), wherein Edinnaya Rossia (Putin's Party) 
gained just ab ove 50% of votes, Pu tin' s team continues to control every dimension of 
power in Russia, including "special force structures", constituting "total control" . The 
Russian press, television and mass media are under similar tight control and are, 
accordingly, widely used by the Kremlin for its "propaganda". 
Russia's political stability is also closely connected to the country's economy 
and GDP. The general welfare of the Russian population has experienced a 
pronounced increase, which has served to legitimize Putin's chosen political course 
among Russians. In comparison to the financial crisis of 1998, Putin and his team 
significantly better managed the effects of the 2008 financial cri sis. However, given 
Russia' s vast terri tory, the country continues to struggle with points of instability, 
including the Caucasus region. These instabilities are nevertheless far better managed 
now than they had been during the period of Yeltsin's presidency (1991-1999). The 
relative peace in Chechnya and in the Caucasus region today attest to the actualized 
success of the Russian political elite in their efforts to restore Russia's political 
power. 
1.4 Defining National Priorities 
The following conclusions about Russia' political dynamics for the last 
twenty years have been analyzed through the lens ofWaltz's neorealist theory. 
Foremost, Russia, as any other major international actor, has acted and continues to 
act in accordance to its fundamental mission - to survive and to preserve its 
sovereignty. Neither superior international body guarantees Russia's survival, nor 
does one regulate conflicting situations between Moscow and other international 
actors . Russia' s survival thus becomes a mission of "self-help". While other poli ti cal 
31 
goals remain present, they are awarded Jess priority in comparison to the state's 
abovementioned fundamental mission. 
In addition to this, the Russian case illustrates the neorealist tenant that the 
international system directly impacts international politics and shapes actors' 
behaviors. Both Russia and the West, namely the United States, would arguably only 
gain from cooperation with one another in ail spheres (military, security, fighting 
transnational threats, such as terrorism, crime, and traffic, and so forth) if factors such 
as their lack of mutual trust, anarchy at the international leve!, fear of each other's 
growth in power and inevitable contradictions related to the distribution in gains were 
not present. Conversely, however, since these system factors continued to play a 
central role in their relations regardless of Russian decision to become ally of the 
West, the (im)balance of power has deterred their effective cooperation. Instead, and 
as a result, Moscow motivated, by its national interest to preserve its statehood 
returns to traditional and rational balance of power poli tics. 
The sudden change in Russia's political course in 1995-1997 can be explained 
as a reaction to these systemic factors. Despite Russia's will to abandon its zero-sum 
game practices in international affairs in 1992, this decision did not alter the West's 
political objectives and methods. European countries and the United States continued 
their policy of power expansion, namely through NATO enlargement, thereby 
outbalancing Russia's sphere of influence on the European continent. Russia's 
perception ofNATO's enlargement as a threat motivated the alignment of its foreign 
policy with realist principles, specifically the diversification of its diplomatie 
relations and the counter-balancing of the Alliance. Russia's opposition to NATO's 
eastward expansion would remain the top priority of its foreign policy for sorne ti me 
(Chapter 2, 3 ). 
Russia' s prioritization of its security and the protection of its sovereignty can 
likewise be seen through Moscow's efforts to stabilize and promote the growth of its 
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economy, primarily through the maximization of its profits from high oil and gas 
priees. The elevated priees of these resources have, and continue to be, sustained 
through the resource dependence of European countries and former Soviet republics. 
This dependency has, alternately, also served to endow Moscow with financial and 
negotiating capital with these entities. Russia has consequently continued to act to in 
such a way asto use its available resources to promote its national interests. 
Finally, it is in Russia's national interest to increase and consolidate its power 
in the space of the former Soviet Union. This contention is based on simple pragmatic 
calculations. For one, Russia already possesses the means, assets and necessary levers 
to influence the politics of the former Soviet Republics. Amongst these means and 
assets are the existing regional institutions where Moscow hold the leading role (CIS, 
CSTO, others), bilateral relations, "pipeline diplomacy", military presence in most of 
these republics (Table 2), and a multitude of other valuable resources (historical and 
identity proximity, trained personnel , existing diplomatie channels, mass-media, 
finances, etc). Russia's increased power over this region would contribute directly to 
the achievement of its national interests, as stated in the Concept of Russian Foreign 
Policy (2008), specifically through secured/enlarged geostrategic borders, 
maintaining strategie assets such as the Black Sea Fleet, Baykonur, etc. (in details 
elaborated in Chapter 4). 
The following chapter will argue that Russia's relations with the West have 
been, and continue to be, gravely affected by NATO's policy of enlargement. More 
specifically, it will be argued that this enlargement policy has limited effective 
strategie cooperation between Russia and the West, and that this has, in turn, served 
to eliminate Russia' s discovery of its place in the new world through the formation of 
strategie long-lasting alliance with Euro-Atlantic region. 
1 
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Table 1. Military spending in % of GDP in EU countries17 
1961-70 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2005 
Austria 1.22 l.l5 1.17 0.91 0.8 
Belgium 3.2 3.05 2.95 1.62 1.3 
Denmark 2.73 2.3 2.22 1.74 1.54 
Finland 1.73 1.56 1.85 1.61 1.2 
France 5. 15 3.87 3.9 3.05 2.56 
German y 4.18 3.42 3.14 1.73 1.44 
Gree ce 4.14 5.83 6.11 4.54 4.24 
Ire land 1.32 1.52 1.47 0.99 0.72 
Ita1y 3.ll 2.52 2.25 1.99 2.04 
Luxembourg 1.18 0.92 1.04 0.8 0.86 
Portugal 6.76 5.09 3.13 2.42 2.18 
Spain 1.94 2.03 2.66 1.48 1.14 
Sweden 3.93 3.29 2.62 2.16 1.74 
Holland 4 3.24 2.99 1.97 1.64 
UK 5.74 4.85 4.77 3.09 2.64 
EU15 (average) 3.36 2.98 2.82 2.01 1.74 
NATO (Europe) 3.86 3.48 3.26 2.39 2.1 
us 8.61 6.15 6.35 3.79 3.66 
NATO 5.22 3.85 3.89 2.56 2.3 
17 Main Source SIPRI (http://sipri.ürg )and http://câï€Cüiî.ürg.ük/DPs/1102.pdf 
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Table 2. Presence of Russian Military troops in former Soviet Repu blies 18 
1993 2007-2012 
Armenia 5,000 3500-5000 
Belarus 30,000 900 
Estonia 5,000 Withdrawn 
Georgia 20,000 3500 19 
Moldova 8,000 1500 
Tajikistan 23,000 5500 
Kazakhstan n/a n/a 
Kyrgyzstan n/a 700 
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Map 1.1. Nabucco gas pipeline project vs Russian South Stream gas pipeline 
18 Main Source Tsygankov, 2006 
19 Most of Russian troops were withdrawn in 2007 from Georgia, but this number represents Russian 
troops remaining after military conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia after 2008 
CHAPTER 2. RUSSIA AND NATO: FROM CONFRONTATION TO 
COOPERATION AND BACK TO REALISM 
This chapter will explore one of the avenues through which Russia may fi nd 
its place in the multipolar world: its alliance with the West. The theoretical 
advantages and existing limitations of this option will be explored. 
An alliance with the West makes sense for Russia because of the geographie 
and ideological proximity shared with Euro-Atlantic civilizations according to 
Huntington (1996). Russia and the West also share notable historical experiences 
such as, for example, their successful cooperation in opposing Nazi Germany (1944-
1945) and defeating Napoleon (1813). Additionally, the probability for military 
conflict within Europe is presently less likely, which diminishes the role of the 
security dilemma in Russia's relations with the West and thus opens the doors of 
opportunity for their cooperation. 
There are also many pragmatic advantages to Russia's alliance with the West. 
These center primarily upon factors related to energy supply and demand. Europe and 
North America together represent the world's largest and most developed region, and 
one that is perpetually consuming energy. Russia, on its part, is resource rich in gas 
and oil. Europe is a particularly viable customer for Russia's energy market because 
this region pays higher priees for Russia's "commodities" than any ether part of the 
world . These high priees are due to the soaring demand from European countries 
(most of whom use gas for heating, and as a dean and efficient fuel for industries) 
and Europe's limited alternatives (alternate sources from Norway, Algeria, Qatar lack 
the infrastructure and stability to fulfil the growing demand). Moreover, the 
infrastructure for Russia' s procurement of energy to Europe is mostly already existent 
(since the 1970s, map 2.4) and is thus simply in need of modernization, as opposed to 
wholesale construction. EU and American companies also possess different, unique 
----~-------------------------
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hydro-carbonate extraction technology that has the capacity to boast the energy 
partnership between these two regions of the world. 
Moreover, from a security perspective, both Russia and the West face the 
same types of new global threats and challenges. These include, for example, 
transnational crime, migration, smuggling, climate change, and separatism. In a 
globalized and highly interdependent world, teaming up to combat or at the !east 
reduce the abovementioned emerges as the most effective solution. 
The advantages ofRussian-West cooperation, however, remain theoretical. As 
such, these benefits contradict the realist state-based self-help system, as described in 
Chapter 1 and in the classic works of Waltz (1979), H.E. Carr (1963) and 
Morgenthau (1968) . Russia and the West, in actuality, are fi xated on their respective 
mercantilist, selfish and self-interested goals to (separately) expand their domination 
in Europe. It will be argued that their formation of an effective and mutually 
beneficiai alliance is thus limited by the realist security dilemma. Russia sees itself as 
a Great Power with exclusive rights of influence in former Soviet republics. 
Conversely, the U.S ., acting as a global hegemon, ignores Russia's interests and 
instead encourages the departure of ex-Soviet republics from Moscow' s sphere of 
influence. In addition, NATO 's enlargement policy to the East and its politico-
military agenda abroad20 are perceived by Moscow's policymakers as a direct threat 
to Russia's geostrategic security. 
Historically, however, Russia 's relations with the West have not always been 
co id. 
20 Here 1 refer to NATO's active military engagement in Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and 
Libya {2011), despite Russia's objections to the same in the UN Security Council (to be developed in 
more detail in t his chapter) . 
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2.1 Russia's Warmed Relations with the West Turn Sour 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made newfound attempts to 
Westernize, which translated into warming of its relations with the U.S./NATO. The 
newly democratie Russia (1991) was motivated primarily by Western promises of 
financial aid (Primakov, 1999). The cornerstone of Russia's Westemization efforts 
was the country's adoption of the so-called "Kozyrev Doctrine" (1992-1994). This 
was a pro-Western extemal political course that was oriented toward Russia's 
integration with the West to the detriment of the country's own traditional interests, 
namely Russia's domination over the post-Soviet space. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, by the second half of the nineties, 
however, Russia's internai political elite and domestic society became highly critical 
of the "Kozyrev Doctrine". Criticism of this Doctrine stemmed from internai 
problems, such as failed economie reforms, and external factors, such as NATO's 
enlargement (by inviting former Russian allies: Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic). Alliance coming closer to Russian border and altering the European 
balance of power, paired with Moscow's total inability to anyhow influence NATO 
decision was a major point of rethinking its foreign policy. With the rise of the first 
diplomatie crisis between Russia and the US./ NATO, their recently warmed 
relations began to turn sour. 
Along with NATO enlargement the Balkan Crisis as well played an important 
role in determining the subsequent orientation of Russia's foreign policy. Both 
political events would ultimately divert Russia's focus away from the West and revert 
it back toward balance of power politics. A crumbling Yugoslavia and the drive for 
independence of each of its small states called in the defence of the Big Powers. 
Russia, Germany, France, and the United States each pursued their own narrow 
political interests by lending their support to particular states in the region (Brossard, 
2001). 
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Russia lent its support to Serbia. However, despite its efforts to support this 
country, namely through the Balkan Contact Group21 , it was unable to prevent the 
U.S./NATO's bombing of Belgrade in December of 1999 (Primakov, 1999). This 
caused Moscow's already dwindling illusion of being a "Great Power" to vanish 
completely. Moscow's false impression as such first came to a head two years earlier 
(in 1997) when Russia's opposition towards NATO's intensions to accept three new 
members (see above) was ignored. Despite the creation of the Russia-NATO Counsel 
(1997), which was intended by the U.S . to be a kind of compensation for Moscow for 
the abovementioned NATO membership of ex-communist countries, Moscow in 
reality did not obtain any tool to influence NATO's decisions in regard to European 
Security. This is exemplified by the aforementioned NATO bombing of Belgrade in 
1999. 
The NATO membership of the three previously mentioned countries was 
perceived by Russia as a major threat to its national security. From the realist 
perspective, the reason is self-evident. Realists would argue that Russia feared the 
increased imbalance of power. Moscow had realized after three to four years of 
continuous political and economie decline (1991-1995) that Western promises of 
support have no power and no value in the self-help system. However, the limited 
available resources or leverages that Russia had to influence the situation facilitated 
the Western allies' ability to simply take advantage of the country's weakness. 
2.2 NATO's Enlargement to the East; a Perceived and Real Threat for Russia 
Russia's threatened sense of security would subsequent! y be heightened by the 
U.S./NATO's foreign policy agenda for Central Asia and encroachment on the ex-
Soviet space after the events of 9/11 (2001). It is a well-known fact that Moscow' s 
21 Negotiation group/committee over the Balkan problem, in which both Russia and US were part 
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political interests have focused on dominating former Soviet republics since the 
Russian Empire. The Ex-Soviet space represents vital security resources for Russia, 
as described in Chapter 1.3. 
The U.S./NATO's foreign policy agenda for Central Asia (including military 
action in Afghanistan, and U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan) and 
lately "Color Revolutions"22 (discussed later in this Chapter) thus represent 
considerable conflicts of interests, which still persist at present, that negate the 
potential for Russia's cooperation with the West. 
The most notable perceived security threat for Russia was NATO's 
enlargement over time and the pattern of this enlargement. The former has changed 
the balance of power in Europe, situating Alliance military bases next to Russia's 
border. 
In 1992, the Warsaw Pact led by the USSR was terminated with the collapse 
of the Communist Bloc. Russia's power and especially its military capabilities 
subsequently largely declined23 . Conversely, over the course of the last twenty years, 
NATO has had four rounds of enlargement. Through these rounds it has accepted 
thirteen new members, most ofwhom are former allies of the Communist bloc. 
As one can observe from Figure 2.1, the pattern ofNATO's enlargement has 
positioned the Alliance's bases increasingly close to Russia's border. The realist 
explanation for this strategy would be a simple one: NATO's enlargement to the East 
seeks to limit Russia's ability to influence its former Soviet allies, thereby excluding 
22 Since 2001, the U.S. has installed its military bases in Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan (to support its 
operation in Afghanistan). Since the U.S. was supporting the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005), 
this gravely irritated the Kremlin and thus impacted their bilateral relations. ln 2006, the U.S. military 
base in Uzbekistan was withdrawn (Chapter 3). 
23 1 refer to considerable cuts in military personnel, total decrease of pilots' skills, obsolete equipment 
and other related problems, which are attested to by Russia's poor performance in the First Chechen 
War (1994-1996). 
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it from the European Security's decision making processes and affecting the balance 
of power in Europe in favour of the West. 
Why does Russia see itself as having to be included in European decision-
making on security issues? The most summative explanation that I found was one of 
Kosacev's arguments, which was cited in Primakov's book, "Gody v bol 'shoy 
politike "24, «since Russia represents half of the Euro-Asiatic continent it shall not be 
excluded, especially by the US. who does not belong to this continent» (1999: 175). 
The balance of power in Europe is also shaped by a so-ca11ed "soft power" 
employed by Brussels and Washington. This can best be understood through the 
mechanisms of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program25 and the Warsaw Initiative 
Funds26 (both 1aunched in 1994). These aimed to find opportunities for cooperation 
between NATO members and any non-members (PfP nations) in a legal and 
transparent way. 
The launch of PfP initially represented a diplomatie solution between 
Washington and Moscow. It allowed NATO to interact with other countries 
(Partners) that were non-NATO members without enforcing NATO membership. 
Later (in 1996) the notion of NATO membership was introduced to the Partners as 
optional. Very soon thereafter, PfP related programs and mechanisms allowed 
Partners to seek full membership if they so desired, specifically through the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP)27 Interestingly, since 1994, twelve new members 
that are former Soviet allies have been invited and/or accepted to join NATO. From 
this reality it may therefore be deduced that even though their membership was not 
24 Years in big politics (my translation) 
25 Www.Nato.int/pfp 
26 http :(/www.pims.org/eucom-pfp/pfp-wif- US financial support program to PfP developing 
countries 
27 1bid 
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mandatory, PfP motivated most European Partners from the former Soviet bloc to 
join NATO or at the least consider this option. 
The joining of these new NATO members ultimately changed the balance of 
power within NATO and enabled the U.S. to increase its influence in Europe 
(Primakov, 1999: 178).A notable example of this fact is the military and political 
support that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and ether PfP Partners lent to U.S. 
operations in Iraq in 2003, despite direct opposition to the same by France and 
Germany. 
Since the beginning of the Twenty-First century, NATO has, through PfP and 
bilateral dialogues, actively engaged with Partner Nations to build their democratie 
institutions and to help draft fundamental strategie documents (such as national 
security strategies and military doctrines) in their respective countries. In this way, 
NATO has penetrated different politicallevels of Partner Nations, thereby extending 
its tools of influence, access to information, and overall power in the Euro-Atlantic 
region and Eastern Europe. 
Moscow's policymakers and security experts share concerns over NATO's 
Eastward expansion. Yeltsin and later Putin repeatedly warned the West, in particular 
the U.S., about Russia's perspective on the matter. Then-president Putin's famous 
speech at Munich in 2007 serves to illustrate the Kremlin's standpoint on NATO's 
policy of enlargement: 
"It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, [ ... ] 1 think it is 
obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of 
the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents 
a serious provocation that reduces the leve! of mu tuai trust. And we have the right to 
ask: against whom is this expansion intended?"28 
28 Full text: http://www.securityconference.de/Putin-s-speech.381.0.htmi?&L=l 
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Statements as such make evident that, as neorealists would argue, Russia 
perceived NATO's policy of enlargement to the East as a direct threat to the country's 
security for reasons relating to balance of power. 
Security expert Alexei Arbatov29 shares same realist vtston that NATO's 
enlargement represent a threat to Rus sian security . He adds that Russia converse! y 
has no control or influence in this regard due to its political and economie 
weaknesses. Apart from altered Balance of power in Europe in favour of Brussels' 
headquarters for the last two decades NATO has altered its military policy in the 
Euro-Atlantic region from defensive to offensive. NATO has participated in major 
operations in Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Iraq in the absence of the consent of the U.N. 
Security Counsel. NATO' s enlargement and its newly adopted tactics (military 
operations), which surpass its traditional Euro-Atlantic area of responsibility, 
combined with Russia's considerably weakened armed forces, has made it imperative 
for Russia to focus on state security (Arbatov, 2009). 
It should be mentioned here that similar explanations have also been offered 
by other Western experts, such as Kramer (2009), as well 30 
Other important Russian political figures present a radical view of "Great 
Russia". Ziuganov and Jirinovski, for example, take distant position that NATO's 
policy as being aggressive and aimed to take control ofRussia. Zyuganov writes: 
"Facts are stubborn lhings. They attest that NATO is quietly continuing to prepare an 
invasion of Russia. Our troops on the European theatre are outnurnbered by 10-12 
times by those of NATO. In Europe alone NATO has 36 divisions, 120 brigades. 
11,000 tanks, 23,000 pieces of ordinance and 4500 war planes. What is the purpose 
of having such huge military might? To fight international terror which today is held 
29 To mention that Alexei Arbatov, he is widely recognized as a security expert in Russia and 
represents pro-western Russian political party- "Yabloko", which is in opposition to Putin's party. 
3
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up as the main justification for the existence of NATO? " (Zyuganov, 2010) 3 1 
It is quite clear that neither the Kremlin nor the Russian political elite as a 
whole (including the opposition) has any confidence in NATO's democratie 
intentions for a "partnership for peace". 
2.3 Russia Addresses its Perceived Security Threat from the West: from 
Retaliation to Cooperation 
Beginning in the late twentieth century, Russia made attempts to retaliate 
against NATO for its Eastward enlargement through the use of severa! diplomatie 
counter-measures. At first, Moscow closed the country's NATO information center 
(1997). Russia' s leading poli ti cians from the Legislative Duma, such as Ziuganov and 
Stepashin (future prime-minister of Russia in 1998) publicly discussed the need to 
lend military support to their Yugoslavian brothers (then aggressed by NATO) and to 
accept Serbia in the Russian-Belorussian Union (April 1999)32 . Through the latter 
Russia signalled to the West that it would fight with Serbia against NATO. These 
proclamations, however, ultimately proved to be political bluffs. The weakness of 
Moscow's executives prevented Duma's aggressive political reactions from being 
realized. 
In 1999, Russian Prime Minister Primakov would show a historie sign of 
protest against the US . Subsequent to US. President Clinton's decision to bomb 
Belgrade (1999), Primakov announced the cancellation of his planned meeting with 
the US. high officiais by tuming his plane around mid-trip (Primakov, 1999). 
31 
"Can one trust NATO's friendliness?" http://www.northstarcompass.org/nsc1012/zyuganov.htm 
32 TV program "Segodnea" on NIT Russian channel on 15 april1999 at 9.00. "Fraction "Yabloko" 
refuses to vote for accepting Serbia in Russian-Byelorussian Union" . 
http:// www .y a bioko. ru/Pu bi/Radio TV /ivan-ntv-2. htm 1 
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Newly elected President Putin (2000) was left with a complex dilemma in 
dealing with West On the one hand, he needed to find alternative financial and 
political resources to rectify the distorted balance of power for Russia in Europe. On 
the other hand, he needed the West's help and recognition in order to overcome 
Moscow's economie difficulties . 
The events of 9/11 (2001) motivated a pragmatic Putin to re-try to make 
Russia an equal partner of the West Russia offered its assistance to the US. in its 
global war on terrorism. This was namely in the form of intelligence sharing. The 
US. accepted the provided information but never responded to the Kremlin with clear 
signs for a partnership. The relatively warmed US.-Russian relations lasted until 
around 2003-2004. In the latter period, the US. capitalized on Russia's openness to 
cooperation by inviting seven other members (including the Baltic states' , former 
Soviet Republics) to join NATO. Once again, from Russian perspective, Moscow's 
"good will" benefitted only US. interests. This brought to head the second major 
crisis in Russia-NATO relations. 
2.4 Rus si a-West Relations Turn Sour Anew; Provoking More Aggressive 
Russian Retaliation 
After the millennium, a wave of democratie "Colour Revolutions" in former 
Soviet republics would bring pro-American politicians to power. As a result of the 
Revolution of Roses (2003)33, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze34 was 
substituted by pro-American Mikhail Saakashvilli. Pro-American leaders were 
similarly brought to power by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Tulip 
Revolution in Kirghizstan (2005). Russia not only lost its influence in these 
33 Georgia After the 'Rose Revolution'. Eden Cole & Philipp H. FI uri, Vien na and Ge neva 2005 
34 Although Shevardnadze was not entirely loyal to Moscow he profited from the "convenient for 
Moscow" status. 
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strategically vital areas wherein pro-Russian leadership previously prevailed but the 
leaders ofboth Ukraine and Georgia declared their states' intentions to join NATO in 
the near future (Herd, 2005). 
This marked "Russia' s worst foreign-policy defeat in the post-Soviet period" 
(Herd, 2005: 17). In 2005, a message from the central federal TV channel in Russia 
proclaimed the following with respect to the prevalence of pro-Americanism in 
former Soviet republics: "to put it simply, the view of the progression is as follows: 
'The day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi . Today : Kiev. Tomorrow: 
Moscow"' (Herd, 2005:17). In addition to Pro-Western regime changes was the threat 
of the launch of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission whereby NATO air fighters 
were to police the airspace of the Bal tic States next to Russia's airspace 35 . 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the international structure forced Russia 
to react in arder to ensure its survival. In accordance with realist theory, Russia 
consolidated its available resources in an effort to correct the created imbalance of 
power and to defend its interests. Moscow had no choice but taking counter-steps. 
The Kremlin's policy was initially aimed to quell the Western aspirations of 
former Soviet republics. Among its first actions taken to punish those who left its 
sphere of influence, Russia demanded higher priees for its natural gas. It then 
imposed an embargo on goods from states that were highly enthusiastic to 
Westernize, namely Georgia and Moldova. Furthermore, Russian gas company 
Gazprom engaged in controversial pipeline wars with Kiev36 (map 2.4), causing 
Europe to suffer from the cold in the middle of January in 2006. Over-all Moscow 
was able to take advantage of the polarized poli ti cal situation in Ukraine, since col or 
revolution, by supporting pro-Russian candidate Yanukovitch who was elected 
President in 2010. 
35 http://kariuomene.kam.it/en/structure 1469/air force/nato air - policing mission .html and 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news 85569.htm?selectedlocale=en 
36 Over 60% of Russian gas is transported through Ukrainien territory 
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In 2006-2007, Georgia-Russian relations also became very tensed and full of 
provocations. Multiple diplomatie scandais and disputes were on the first pages of 
Russian newspapers. Amongst these were the introduction of a visa regime between 
the two countries, spy scandals37, and Moscow's hidden (later open) assistance to 
separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Much in Ii ne with Machiavelli 's realism, 
Moscow discarded the severity of the means that it employed to achieve the ends that 
its foreign policy sought to achieve, which was to punish those who decided to leave 
its sphere of influence. 
Another dimension of the political confrontation between Russia and the 
West, which only served to overwhelm the situation even more, was Kosovo's 
independence in February 2008. This sparked a furious reaction from the Kremlin. 
Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs considered it a grave violation of international 
norms and a "big mistake" on the part of the West (Lavrov, 2007). Moscow had in 
multiple ways wamed Europe and the United States that their decision to recognize 
Kosovo's independence could lead to the recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
other similar cases abroad. In 2007, Minister Lavrov wrote: 
"Regarding Kosovo, independence from Serbia would create a precedent that goes 
beyond the existing norms of international law. Our partners' inclination to give way 
to the blackmail of violence and anarchy within Kosovo contrasts with the 
indifference shown to similar violence and anarchy in the Palestinian territories, 
where it has been tolerated for decades while a Palestinian state has yet to be 
established. "38 
Despite Russia's objection, and violation on UN Security Council resolution 
(1998), Kosovo's independence was recognized by most European countries in 
February 2008. The Kremlin condemned this decision and proclaimed that it would 
37 http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/11/10/another-spy-scandal-in-georgia/ 
38 Sergey Lavrov "Containing Russia: Back to the Future?" link: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp 4.nsf/0/8F800SFOCSCA3710C32573100022E227 
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'open Pandora's box' 39 . During a meeting with colleagues from the ex-Soviet 
republics, Putin harshly remarked: 
"The Kosovo precedent is a terrifying precedent. It in essence is breaking open the 
entire system of international relations that have prevailed not just for decades but for 
centuries. [ ... ] And it, without a doubt, will bring on itself an en tire chain of 
unforeseen consequences. [ .. . ] In the end, this is a stick with two ends and that other 
end will come back to knock them on the head someday."40 
In addition to Kosovo's independence, another major concern for Russia's 
foreign policy in relation to the West and NATO's enlargement was potential 
NATO's proposai of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine at 
its summit in Bucharest in April 2008. This marked a solid red line in the relations 
between the U.S./NATO and Russia. 
Since bath Ukraine and Georgia represent vital geostrategic spaces in which 
Russia wants to remain the ab solute power, the "survival" element of Waltz' s 
neorealist theory came into play. Moscow, in defence of its security and resources, 
was forced to fight for its place in the international system. As will be illustrated 
below, 2008 marked a real breakthrough year for Russia's Foreign policy in its 
opposition to NATO enlargement and the restoration of the relative balance of power 
in Europe. 
Despite the U.S.'s support of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership 
(through offering MAP to these republics), Russia convinced major European powers 
to refute their acceptance of the same prior to and during the NATO Summit in 
Bucharest in April of 2008. Putin and his team used multiple diplomatie tactics to 
achieve this end, namely numerous meetings and bilateral relations, and persona! 
relations with Moscow's European counterparts. Germany, Italy and France 
39 
"Kosovo precedent 'terrifying': Putin" Associated Press, 22 February 2008 
40 ibid 
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ultimately opposed granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine41 at the 2008 Summit 
(Mankoff, 2009; Levesque, 2009; Asmus, 2010). Although President Bush succeeds 
in !etting the following statement to penetrate the official NATO Summit declaration: 
" 23. NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia ' s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members 
ofNAT0."42 
This statement initiates a strong reaction from Kremlin towards Georgia. 
Moscow started a quite open and aggressive policy aimed to increase the 
destabilization of the political situation in this republic. Russia ultimately willing to 
bring Georgia back to the point of departure from its sphere of influence, Moscow 
withdrew itself from the interdiction regime of economie relations with Abkhazia and 
immediately afterward rendered open its special political relations with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (which had since 1992 been discrete). Russia provided these 
unrecognized states with bath military and financial aid43 These factors together 
served to escalate tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia44 
Culmination point of the events, that would have the most profound impact 
for Russia in its relations with the West, was Moscow's military engagement with 
U.S.-backed Georgia in South Ossetia and its later recognition of two separatist 
republics (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). This was a classic Cold War - style clash 
between Russia and the United States on territory that was extemal to both. Through 
this incident Russia communicated a strong message to bath Washington and 
Brussels about its determination to protect its vital interests and the consequences that 
contenders would have to face for their disregard of the same. Russia also deterred 
the possibility that Georgia, and similarly U.S.-backed Ukraine, would join NATO 
for a long time. Furthermore, Moscow warned other ex-Soviet republics of the 
41 Although the final NATO Summit declaration in paragraph #23 states: "We agreed today that these 
countries will become members of NATO". 
42 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official texts 8443.htm 
43 http://kom mersant.ru/doc/86455 7 and http://kommersant.ru/doc/883332 
44 Russia vs Georgia: The Fal/out. Crisis Group Europe Report W195, 22 August 2008 
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possibie outcome of their seeking membership with NATO (Mankoff, 2009, 
Levesque, 2009). 
To mention that similarly to Cold war era, the U.S.A., on its part, has since 
2003, provided large military support to Georgia. The majority of US. assistance has 
to this day been effected via cooperative bilateral programs, such as Georgia Train 
and Equip Program (GTEP), special operation training with US. experts, and 
International Military Exchange Training (IMET), amongst others. With the help of 
Ukraine45, the US, and other countries, Georgia's military budget has increased from 
18 million USD to 780 million USD between 2002 and 200846 . This figure represents 
a 40-fold increase and about 8.8% of Georgia's GDP in 200747 With increased 
military and economie power, as well as the desire to res tore its territorial integrity, 
Georgian President Saakashvilli's was determined to solve internai conflict through 
the use ofmilitary force (Rice, 2011). 
On August 7th, 2008, Georgia initiated military actions against South Ossetia. 
Within a few hours, however, Russian peacekeeping troops, reinforced with other 
military reserves, entered the conflict zone and forced Georgia's retreat. 
According to the Crisis Group Europe (Report N°195, 22 August 2008), the 
Kremlin anticipated Georgia's military aggression towards South Ossetia and 
possibly towards Abkhazia. Russia proved to be fully prepared for military action 
against Georgia. 
Russia's intervention considerably weakened Georgian Armed Forces. Tbilisi 
did not receive any military help from NATO or the US., who limited themselves to 
empty promises and a minor "show of force" by sending warships into the Black Sea. 
45 http :1/podrobnosti. ua/power /security/2008/08/07 /545634. htm 1 
46 Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia. Cri sis Group Europe Report W193, 5 June 2008 (p.9) 
47 ibid 
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Shortly after Georgia's attack on Tshinvali, Russia referred to the "genocide 
of the Ossetian people"48, same argument which was used by NATO in Kosovo. 
Ultimately, Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
the only solution to protect these republics from Georgia's aggression. This 
phenomenon is evidently paralleled with Russia' s previous warnings of the 
consequences of the West's recognition of Kosovo' s independence as a "terrifying 
precedent". 
As a result of this military conflict, Russia not only prevented Ukraine and 
Georgia's NATO membership for the near future and showed its determination in the 
protection of its national interests, but as result destabilized Georgia also dissolved 
the interests of foreign investors to continue building the Nabucco pipeline (map 1.1). 
The latter was aimed to provide European countries with an alternative to Russian gas 
(Lukas, 2008). In addition, South Ossetia and Abkhazia granted Russia with military 
basing rights in their territories as a source of security for both republics49 . To this 
day, this provides Moscow with important geostrategic assets in the region. 
It is important to note that Russia invaded Georgia in spite of its 
acknowledgement of the risks involved in so doing, namely the onset of a major 
political conflict with the West. In order to prevent Georgia and Ukraine' s tentative 
NATO membership, Russia willingly jeopardized the absolute gains of its profitable 
relations with European countries. The above is a notable illustration of Russian 
reaction facing major security threat toits statehood (element of survival) forwarded 
by Waltz' s neorealist theory (Chapter 1). 
48 At the beginning of the conflict Russia' s mass-media and politicians were claiming that the death 
toll among Ossetians was approximately 2000, which turned into around 117 after independent 
analysis. Russia has never officially commented on this discrepancy. Source: Russian massmedia 
during the conflict and Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout. Crisis Group Europe Report W195, 22 August 
2008. 
49 Russia has announced where exactly its military bases would be located. Multiple news channels 
one of which is he re: http:/! korrespondent.net/russia/639702-minoborony- rf-opredelilos-s-mestom-
dislokacii-voennyh-baz-v-abhazii-i-yuzhnoj-osetii 
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2.5 Summary ofRussia-West Relations 
As has been illustrated above, from the 1990s until present, Russia and the 
West have clashed on major security issues, which have limited and continue to limit 
their effective strategie cooperation. It can also be said that the severity of their 
discordance has worsened over time. Over the last two decades, NATO has advanced 
up to the Russian border (2004), Moscow briefly lost its influence in Georgia and 
Ukraine due to the US-backed Color Revolutions in these countries (2003-2004), and 
in 2008 Russia undertook military operations to protect its core national interests and 
prevent potential Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership. 
At present, Russian-American (Western) strategie alliance at global level is 
definitely excluded. Both the US. and Russia' s vision of European security remain 
conflicting and neither party has expressed any intention to shift its perspective 
towards finding a compromise. Russia's self-perception as a Great Power with 
exclusive rights of influence in former Soviet republics contrasts the U.S's actions 
and encouragement for the departure of ex-Soviet republics from Moscow's sphere of 
influence. It should be said that the U. S.' s conduct in this regard is more prudent than 
it was before the military conflict of2008. 
In addition to the failed alliance between Russia and the West, the 2008 
military conflict has highlighted an important reality for Russia, which is that it has 
no other alli es in the region. Not a single Russian partner supported Moscow in the 
conflict nor in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence. Despite 
forming the CSTO with Russia, and sharing strong and friendly ties with Russia since 
the fall of the USSR, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan refused to recognize the 
independence of the separatist republics. Likewise, China, who has consistently 
respected Russia' s protection of its national interests in the former Soviet Union 
(although in a very reserved fashion) also did not support Russia in the matter. The 
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details of Russia's relations with China, and the benefits and pitfalls of their 
cooperation will be examined in the next chapter. 
NATOm!:? 
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(/ 
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Fig. 2.1 NATO New Members since 1997 
Existing gas pipelines 
Planned Gas Pipelines 
EU members 
Russia 
Map 2.4 Russian Gas Pipelines Network to Europe 
54 
CHAPTER 3. SINO-RUSSIANRELATIONS 
This chapter will explore another dimension ofRussia' s quest to find its place 
m the multipolar world, which could be a possible alliance with the East. As 
aforementioned, given its present military and economie state, previous and present 
cooperation China may stand out for Russia's as one of the most interesting partner 
for a strategie partnership in the East. In Russian bilateral trade China ranks first 
(before Germany)50. Sino-Russian relations related to economie trade, military 
exports and political cooperation by large bypass other significant actors from Asia, 
namely India, Japan, Korea, Iran, etc (Lo, 2008; Trenin 2005). 
There are a number of reasons for which dialogue between China and Russia 
should be advantageous for both countries. The major argument is that, at a systemic 
level, both countries oppose the unilateral actions of the West. This includes their 
shared opposition to past NATO operations in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, and 
recent NATO operations in Libya. Beijing and Moscow also share views on 
international politics, the cornerstone of which is their opposition to US. global 
hegemony and view of the world as multiploar. 
Amongst other reasons for co-operation we may consider geopolitical 
argument. The enormous size oftheir territories equips Russia and China with major 
global potential. Taken together, the Sino-Russian territory comprises 115 of the 
globe. These two countries also border important geopolitical regions such as Europe, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, the Asia Pacifie, the US. and Canada. 
One may recall that size of territory, size of population and military strength 
are among Waltz's severa] "ingredients of power", alongside resource endowment, 
economie capability, political stability and competence (Waltz 1979: 131). Well, in 
this case China has the world's biggest population (1.4 billion), both countries 
5
° China ranks second compared to EU as whole. 
-- l 
1 
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possess advanced military technologies and nuclear arms, and both are permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. 
In addition to the above, China and Russia share common historical 
experiences in the twentieth century as communist countries and allies (except after 
1960s). They also presently share a common view on severa! global challenges, 
namely US. hegemony, separatism, trans-national crime, and arms smuggling, 
among others. One can reasonably assume that these commonalities would produce a 
situation favorable to their long-term cooperation. 
Another argument in support of a Sino-Russian alliance has its root in China's 
energy needs and Russia's natural resource endowments. China is presently in 
constant, growing need of resources such as oil, gas and raw materials to sustain its 
rapid economie growth . China currently imports half of its oil needs. Russia, on its 
part, overproduces and continuously exports these commodities. Oïl and gas represent 
60 per cent of Russian exports and almost half of its GDP51 . In addition to its high 
leve! of energy consumption, Chinais a viable customer for Moscow's resources by 
virtue of it being an alternative to the West. As such, it contributes to Russia's 
reduction of its dependence on European buyers. 
Despite the great opportunities available for Sino-Russian cooperation at 
international leve!, it will be argued that the relations between the two at bilateral 
(inter-state) leve!, outside the global balance of power, are not exempt from the 
negative influences of systemic factors, as described by Waltz ' s neorealist theory. On 
the contrary, these factors and other difficulties in the relations between China and 
Russia (namely the security dilemma, conflicting national interests of China and 
Russia including the influence in Central Asia) significantly limit, the opportunity for 
their long-term stable alliance. 
51 Multiple sources including Bobo Lo's 2008 Axis of Convinience (Chapter 8). 
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In arder to illustrate this reality, this chapter will focus on two central 
dimensions of Sino-Russian relations: energy and military-political cooperation 
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
These are particularly worthy of examination because they encompass China 
and Russia's common political interests, political visions and supply-demand 
formulas. Furthermore, both are central topics of discussion at the highest political 
level in each of these two countries. As such, they constitute an important strategie 
role in Sino-Russian relations, which impact on global politics. 
3.1 Sino-Russian Energy Dialogue 
China constitutes the world's second largest economy in terms of GDP after 
the United States52 At present, China's internai production of ail and gas satisfies 
approximately 50 per cent of its actual needs. China' s ability to secure reliable energy 
supplies has thus evidently become critical for its continued growth. Given China's 
continuous and projected economie growth, the domestic demand for oil will only 
increase in the long term (fig 3.1). 
At present, China imports roughly half of its yearly intake of oil, which is 
approximately nine million barrels per day53. The growing demand for oil in China 
has rendered the cost of this commodity high and its access limited. The country 
continues to derive the majority of its energy from coal. This is mostly because it 
does not have any other alternatives to this obsolete and inefficient energy resource. 
Coal continues to comprise approximately 65-75 percent of China' s energy re sources 
and is mostly domestically produced. Alternatives such as natural gas represent Jess 
52 Source: IMF and World Bank 
53 ElA: international petroleum. Link: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH#pet 
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than 3-4 per cent of the country's total energy intake. As such, they are not as 
noteworthy for our analysis as is oil. 
Oil and its continuous demand play an important role in China's foreign 
policy. It is highly important for the country to have access to reliable and diverse oil 
supplies. As evidenced by the diagram (fig 3.2, fig 3.3), China imports from at !east 
twenty different countries. Each supplier is viewed with importance by the growing 
super-power because of the respective number of barrels of oil that each represents . 
Russia's share in this oil supply-chain is 6 per cent, with potential future growth 
(explained below). 
At the end of the1990s and the beginning of the millennium, Moscow 
experienced a crisis with the United States/NATO (Chapter 2) and, under Primakov, 
subsequently shifted its foreign policy from the West towards the prioritization of a 
partnership with East: China and India and other Eastern countries. One of the 
products ofRussia's cooperation with China was the latter's active negotiation for the 
construction of an oil pipeline from Russian Siberia to the Daiqin in Northem China. 
While at first this project seemed simple it grew to be quite complicated, mainly due 
to political reasons. 
In 1999, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former head of Russia' s then-biggest oil 
company, Yukos, negotiated an agreement with China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) to construct an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daiqin with the 
capacity of 20-30 million tones/year, which was signed in March 2003. "Putin and 
Hu Jintau endorsed this agreement two months later" (Lo, 2008: 143) 
Few months later (2003), however, Putin's actions would change the course 
of these plans. In that year, Putin's team openly declared a war to Russian oligarchs 
to regain full political power in Russia. In this way Kremlin assaulted Yukos by 
charging the company with tax evasion. This led to the imprisonment of 
Khodorkovsky, which in tum led to the disintegration of this oil giant (Yukos). The 
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Russian-Chinese joint oil project therefore came to a standstill, new players came to 
this political-economical struggle. 
1 will refrain from going into depth about the Kremlin-Yukos scandai and 
instead reflect mostly upon the systemic factors related to Russian-Chinese relations, 
as they are of the greatest importance to our analysis. 
Here it is important to mention that by 2001-2003 Russia- US relations had 
relatively improved. Since the events of 9111, Putin's administration made severa! 
steps forward in favor to restore the positive political climate between Russia and the 
West (US.). At that time, Russia's relations with Japan were also on the rise. 
In 2004 Tokyo proposed to sponsor an alternative route proposed by 
Transneft54 for the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline - towards Nahodka, a 
seaport in the Pacifie. Japan was proposing botha better financial package than China 
and more oil to be sold (Lo, 2008: 143-145) (map 3.1). 
By building a pipeline to the Pacifie port, Russia would have access to more 
customers from a single location, specifically China, Japan, and Korea, as opposed to 
provisioning its resources to simply one of these three countries. In this way, Russia 
would secure itself with diversified customers. 
Amidst these propositions, Russian Ecology Service suddenly announced in 
2004 that Russia's original pipeline project to Daiqin represented a serious ecological 
threat to the Baïkal Lake. This forced the discontinuation of this project in this 
particular direction. Russia used these ecological alleged reasons to explain to China 
the need to halt this project indefinitely. The desperation of Chinese part resulted to 
extreme measures, such as CNPC would later even try to offer Transneft the gift of 
400 million USD to keep the project running, to no avail (Lo, 2008:144-45 55). At the 
54 Russia's major ail transit company, favored by the Kremlin 
55 Lo references Moscow Times from March 23, 2006 
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political leve!, China nevertheless continued to keep its relative calm and relentlessly 
sought to persuade Russia' s poli ti cal leaders to cons tru ct a j oining pipeline. 
China' s balanced and persistent position, paired with its diplomatie pressure 
and its taking advantage of the poli ti cal changes in Russia' s external situation in 
2005-2006, did result in relative success for Beijing as described below. 
The period 2005-2006 is characterized by a complicated situation for Russia 
in terms of foreign policy. This period comprised a series of Color Revolutions, the 
next round of NATO enlargement (Chapter 2), and increasingly tensed political 
relations with Japan, specifically over the Kuril Islands dispute. At the same time, 
Russia again changed its political line by announcing anew its decision to build a 
pipeline to Daiqin, this time by bypassing the Baïkal Lake to the north. Furthermore, 
at one of the Valdaï meetings (related to Energy security) Putin declared that about 30 
percent ofRussia's oil and gas would flow Eastward in near future56 (Lo, 2008: 132). 
The above matches the neorealist assumptions: Russia, driven by the security 
dilemma, considered it irrational to build a strategie pipeline destined solely to China, 
which could limit higher profits and providing cheap57 resources for the growth of a 
potentially competitor on its border. In addition, the above emphasizes the importance 
of natural resources in international poli tics and the fact that decisions related to oil 
and gas are made at higher political leve! in both countries. 
The final design of the East Siberian oil pipeline was decided upon in 2005-
2006. It represented a compromise between Moscow's interest to bring a main pipe to 
a seaport in Pacifie and China' s interest to have it direct! y linked to its Northern 
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"We anticipate ... in the next 10-15 years ... that a round 30 percent of Russian oil exports will go to 
Asian countries" - V. Putin, September 2006. cited from Bobo lo's book (2008) 
57 ln 1999-2000 the discussed priee was around 25$ a barrel, and priee disputes continued until2011 
province. The pipeline was constructed from Taishet to Perevoznaya with an offshoot 
to China' s Dai qin at the Russian village of Skorovodinoss (map 3.1 ). 
From a pragmatic standpoint, the construction of the pipeline to Perevoznaya 
was the best option for Russia. This is because this port opens the country ' s wealth of 
resources to any potential Asian Pacifie customer. Even if China were not to buy its 
natural resources at market priee, Japan and Korea certainly would, thanks to the 
logic of competition. Despite what may have been the logical and the most 
economically profitable choice, Chinese diplomacy and Russia' s deteriorated 
relations with the West may have ultimately played the main role in Russia's 
decision-making. 
Despite this decision, in 2008 Russia and China remained in dispute over the 
priee formula for Russian oil. The following citation best demonstrates this situation: 
"the two sides were laboring through severa! rounds of negotiations over the loan 
rate, repayment guarantee, and pricing mechanism for oil shipment to China. The 
Russian side preferred a floating, or market, priee for oil delivery and a fixed rate for 
loans from China. China insisted on the opposite: fixed pricing for oil from Russia 
and a floating credit rate to Russia at LIBOR+5 percent. Calling it "absurd lending 
terms," Russian negotiators simply broke away from the talks in Beijing (my italics) 
[ ... ] the two si des met in Moscow a gain [ ... ]. Rosneft indicated that China has 
agreed to the principal terms of the Russians. There was, however, no signing of the 
final agreement by year end. "59 60 
To revert back to a previously mentioned point of analysis, it can be said that 
oil undoubtedly plays a central role in Sino-Russian relations at a political leve!. As 
rendered evident, energy resources have soured the dialogue between Beijing and 
Moscow. 
58 The en tire segment from Skovorodino to Daiqin is build by Chinese part and presently this pipeline 
is operational. 
59 China-Russia Relations: "Embracing a Storm and Each Other?" Comparative Connections v.10 n.4 
2009 
60 To mention that Sino-Russian oil pipeline was launched in 2010-2011 
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The progresswn of Sino-Russian oil relations over time, as seen mainly 
through the lens of the East Siberian pipeline project, serves to highlight the 
following limitations in their long-term cooperation: China lent its political support to 
Russia primarily in an effort to address its resource needs, while Moscow offered its 
resources to China foremost in an effort to develop a new partnership subsequent to 
its deteriorated relations with the West. 
For China, the pipeline deal served as a reality check; it rendered evident that 
Russia is not willing to honor its promises at the priee of Russian national interests. 
The following statement by then-Vice-Minister of the National Development and 
Reforrn Commission, Zhang Guobao, illustrates China's negative perception of the 
"East Siberian Pipeline Saga": 
"One moment Russia is saying they have made the decision, the next saying that no 
decision has been made. To date, there has been no correct information. This is 
regrettable ... Currently, the Sino-Russian pipeline question is one step forward, two 
steps back. Today is cloudy with a chance for sun while tomorrow is sunny with a 
chance for clouds, just like weather forecast" (March 2006) -(Lo, 2008: 132) 
Russia, on its part, experienced the shortcoming of its relations with China 
predominantly with the little support that Beijing lent to its military campaign in 
Georgia (which also misfortunately coincided with the 2008 Olympie Games in 
Beijing) and the non-recognition of the independence for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
3.2 Sino - Russian Cooperation within Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
When looking at the political relations between Russia and China from a realist 
perspective, several important factors must be considered. 
For one, both countries have issues and discordances with the United States. 
Russia's relations with the U.S ./West were mostly covered in Chapters 1 and 2. 
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China's main dispute with the US. centers on, but cannet be reduced to, the issue of 
Taiwan. 
Many of Beijing and Moscow's political contentions with the US. are shared. 
As previously mentioned, both countries are opposed toUS. unipolarity and NATO' s 
unilateral military actions in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Kosovo, which were conducted 
without a UN Security Council mandate. They are also opposed to the American 
presence in Central Asia and the U.S.'s intensions to build the Antibalistic Shield6 \ 
which would cover Europe and potentially Taiwan. Both Russia and China feel a 
similar threat being posed by this global superpower to their respective political 
interests. 
It is assumed that in accordance with the balance of power theory, common 
contentions such as the United States hegemonie actions in Central Asia 
(Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghystan) would encourage Russia and China to 
undertake joint efforts in order to confront these challenges threatening their security. 
The following will explore arguments in support of this assumption, as weil as 
the limitations and contradictions imposed by systemic factors such as presence of 
security dilemma in their bilateral relations, which hinder effective cooperation 
between Beijing and Moscow. 
While both countries cooperate with one another in many ways, the most 
significant political dialogue remains at the following levels : 
Cooperation amongst politicalleaders 
Cooperation within Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
The relative "warming" in relations between Russia and China started under 
the leadership of USSR President Gorbatchev in 1989, but were more significantly 
intensified under Foreign Affairs Minister Primakov (1996-1999) and recently under 
61 http://dni.gov/press releases/20071203 release.pdf 
--- --------------
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Presidents Putin and Medvedev since 200062 . In 1989, Gorbatchev conducted a 
'friendly visit' to China for the first time since the Sino-Russian border disputes that 
arose in the 1960s. In 1996, Moscow, Beijing and ether Central Asian republics 
(Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) signed the so-called Shanghai Agreement, 
which was originally aimed to suppress radical Islamist movements in Central Asia 
and in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Although it is quite obvious that the main 
political drive for both powers was and remains to keep the United States out of 
Central Asia. 
The 1996 Agreement evolved into the Shanghai Five and then into Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. So let us look in details of evolution of 
Sino-Russian relations and development of SCO. 
For the past twelve years, the presidents of China and Russia have met on an 
annual basis to discuss energy and military procurement. They have also conducted 
severa] major social and cultural events in promotion of one another over time. For 
example, 2005 was proclaimed the year of Russia in China and 2006 the year of 
China in Russia (Mankoff, 2009). In 2008, the newly elected president, Medvedev, 
made his first official visit to Beijing (Levesque, 2009, Mankoff, 2009). So-doing 
symbolized Russia's chosen political orientation (toward the East). 
The realized cooperation between Moscow and Beijing can best be 
understood through their mutual recognition of each other's actions and claims that 
were frowned upon and refuted by the U.S./ West (Mankoff, 2009: 207). More 
specifically, China's decision to politically support Russia's military efforts in 
Chechnya63 (1994 and 1999) and Beijing's shared concerns with Moscow over 
security issues regarding the 'Color Revolutions' (2003-2005) through SCO 
62 1n fact the real intense cooperation under Putin started after 2004-2005, when Russian-western 
relations faced another crisis after the series of Col or Revolutions (Chapter 2) 
63 Russia has been heavily criticized by West for abusing hu man right in Chechnya du ring these 
conflicts (also see MacMillan 2009). 
·--------------·----
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declarations. Russia, on its part, recognizes "one China" and refrains from criticism 
ofChina's internai affairs, namely its relations with Tibet (Mankoff, 2009: 206). 
One of the most significant products of Russia and China's political 
cooperation remains the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The five original 
members were Russia, China, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. In 2001 it 
evolved into SCO, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan as its sixth member. Presently 
India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia are observers in the organization64. 
The present SCO agenda has grown to have a more complex agenda in Asia 
(the territory of its members and observers) over time. seo today deals with energy 
security and economie development, opposition to separatism and terrorism, and 
comprises military cooperation among its members. In contrast to NATO, however, 
seo has never identified itself as a military bloc (Mankoff, 2009: 205-210). 
The map below renders evident that the organization covers a large area of the 
Asian continent (Map 3.2). 
Here, we will apply the neorealist paradigm to analyze the impact of this 
organization on international politics and also on Russia's place in the multipolar 
world. 
As one would assume, given their size and relative power, Russia and China 
are the major players in the Central Asian region, each pursuing their own agenda 
based on their respective political interests. 
However, both also see the purpose of SCO differently. On the one hand, 
Russia sees the organization as a counterbalance to NATO and its enlargement 
policy. Scholars have argued that at the inception of SCO, Russia was trying to 
emphasize the importance of its military component and even the consideration of the 
64 Official web site of SCO: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/secretary.asp 
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reproduction of the "Warsaw Pact" (Mankoff, 2009). This vision was not, however, 
shared by China. The latter saw SCO as more of an expansion of its power. China 
uses more soft power methods to promote its interests, such as economie and bilateral 
relations with SCO members (Mankoff, 2009:217-220; Lo, 2008) . 
These realities lend further support to that which was discussed in Chapter 1; 
that stronger powers use global and regional institutions to promote and legitimize 
their political interests (Mearshaimer, 1994). 
Despite their different visions, the two cooperated through SCO to achieve 
their central common interest, which is to keep the U.S.A. out of Central Asia. 
During the SCO summit in 2005, one of SCO's decisions was to request that 
Washington set a timetable of withdrawal of American troops from the territory of 
SCO members Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The latter requested that US remove its 
troops from the K-2 air basé5, which were used to support NATO mission in 
Afghanistan. 
Let us review the following outline of the events that led up to the 
abovementioned goal . 
The year 2001 was one of great importance for their bilateral relations. In that 
year Russia and China's relations experienced increased strength as well as the rise of 
severa! contentions. SCO was officially created and during the meeting ofRussia and 
China's presidents, Zemin and Putin, the necessity to keep NATO and the U.S. out of 
Central Asia was agreed upon (Levesque, 2011; Mankoff, 2009). However, Putin saw 
the events of 9/11 as an opportunity to restore Russia's good relations with the U.S . 
Immediately after these events, Moscow supported Washington' s decision to attack 
Afghanistan by consenting to the U.S.'s use ofKirgizstan and Uzbekistan as military 
65 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HL08Ad01.html 
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air bases (Chapter 2). This evidently irritated Beijing given Moscow's disregard for 
their aforementioned agreement (Mankoff, 2009: 207; Lo, 2008). 
By 2005, the political relations between Russia and the US. , and Russia and 
China had significantly changed. NATO, led by Washington, had in 2004 invited 
seven new members to join the Alliance (Chapter 2), and a series of Col or Revolution 
took place in a number of former Soviet Republics, including the Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan (Chapter 2). The spread of US.- sponsored democratization in the world 
worried both Beijing and Moscow to the same degree. The departure of the influence 
of the US. from Central Asia accordingly resurged as the common goal of both 
powers. 
As a result of SCO meetings and a series of bilateral meetings between China 
and Russia, the setting of a timetable for American withdrawal was agreed upon, 
executed, and achieved. In 2006, the US. withdrew from Uzbekistan. In that same 
year, SCO also rejected the US.'s request to become an SCO observer. While this 
decision was explained to the US. as being consequent to the Jack of land borders 
that the US. shared with any of the SCO members, Beijing and Moscow in reality 
simply opposed the US.'s presence in SCO as part of its common goal to keep the 
US. out of Central Asia. This reality lends further support to the neorealist contention 
that threats to state security are dealt with quickly and made a top political priority. 
Despite the obvious shared geopolitical interests of China and Russia in 
Central Asia in 2005-2006, their relations were limited by a number of factors . 
For one, China has thus far never risked its good relations with the US. by 
lending too much support to Russia. For example, since none of SCO declaration 
contains direct offensive text towards USA, we may deduct that China stood firmly 
behind this. As one may recall , China also did not support Russia when it recognized 
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. China evidently has its 
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own separatist problems (Taiwan and Xinjiang), which due to other pragmatic 
reasons restrain it from supporting Russia in this regard. 
A second, correlated limitation to effective Sino-Russian relations is the lack 
of a common view between both countries on the purpose of SCO. Russia envisions 
the future of SCO as a "full-fledged" security organization (Mankoff, 2009:221). lt is 
obvious that Russia tries to find ways to counterbalance NATO's enlargement policy. 
Conversely, China's policy is oriented toward peaceful coexistence and promoting its 
national interests in Central Asia (mostly energy; oil). Accordingly, Beijing does not 
support the idea of provoking the US., and the West more generally, through the 
policy ofNATO counterbalancing. 
The following highlights the fact that both Russia and China do not in fact 
share long-term common interests and even fewer common views on the same issues. 
Their cooperation can be described as very pragmatic in nature and relatively short-
termed. In 2005, when both China and Russia pursued the same goal to keep the US. 
out of Central Asia, namely by forcing the US. to close its bases in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, the cooperation was at its peak. SCO's requisition that the US. leave 
Uzbekistan was pronounced and in 2006 actually implemented (described above). 
One year earlier, both China and Russia also hosted the biggest military SCO exercise 
ever, the Peace Mission 2005, in which approximately 10000 troops from SCO 
members participated and ali heads of SCO states attended. However, in later years, 
the dynamics between China and Russia slowed down considerably, which 
demonstrated their decreased commitment to one another. For example, the Peace 
Mission in 2009 an 2010 involved only 1000 Russian soldiers and far less mass-
media attention (Table 3.1). In 2012 about 400 Chinese and about 500 Russian troops 
were participating in Tajikistan66 . 
66 http://eng.ehinamil.eom.cn/special-reports/node 54180.htm 
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A close look at China's policy and interests within the SCO may further 
enable us to predict potential future contradictions between Beijing and Moscow. 
Both countries are big and significant regional players. China has already reached the 
rank of world' s second largest economy and its spectacular growth continues today. 
In the realist anarchie world, two powers' policy toward one another is by default 
constrained and shaped by the security dilemma. Presently China is a rising power 
with global potential bordering Russia and with whom the country shares previous 
historical disputes. This potential security threat, cannet be ignored by Russian policy 
makers. 
Presently there are sorne Russian concerns in regard to potential problematic 
issues that occur in the past such as previous border issues (1969) and the illegal 
immigration of Chinese nationals to Russia's undeveloped Far East. 
The resolution of the Amur River border issue is one of Putin's renowned 
successes that was resolved in 2004-2008 through the signing of a border agreement 
between Russia and China. Consequent to this resolution Russia presents itself as free 
of past problems, and in a position to turn over a new leaf in its relations with China 
and achieve mutually beneficiai cooperation. This also demonstrates Russian 
commitment to maintain good relations with growing power such as China. Despite 
this success, however, the potential for future contradictions over borders is not 
excluded. 
The immigration of Chinese nationals to the Far East is a very sensitive and 
controversial security challenge for Russia. Many scholars have underscored the fact 
that Russia's Far East (RFE) is very rich in mineral and oil but continues to be 
undeveloped in terms of its poor infrastructure, and Jack of basic social services and 
essential goods (e.g. milk and meat). Given its remote location, RFE is a territory that 
is very difficult to monitor and control (Mankoff, 2009). 
------------------------- ----
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economie gap in the Far East was 
largely compensated by Chinese goods brought by Chinese sellers. This, in its turn, 
stimulated the phenomenon of Chinese nationals immigrating to Russia. In 2006, 
Putin drew the attention of the Russian Security council to the possibility of losing 
the Far East if the situation persisted. He warned that the immigration of Chinese 
nationals could be coupled with the emigration ofRussian inhabitants. 
Sorne sources have highlighted the potential for the millions of illegal Chinese 
immigrants in RFE to aggravate Moscow's sense of loss of control over the region. 
Others (Lo and Mankoff) daim that the actual number of Chinese immigrants (in 
total) is between 100- 200 thousand, and thus only consider it a minor problem for 
demographie challenges (Lo, 2002; 2008; Mankoff, 2009:224). Whether or not the 
issue of Chinese immigration to RFE is indeed problematic for Russia's territorial 
integrity remains to be seen. However, one can say with confidence that this 
threatened sense of security impacts Russia's cooperation with China in the long 
terrn. 
Russia's cooperation with China in the long-term is equally negatively 
impacted by the variety of previously mentioned problem areas, which ali have the 
capacity to become larger issues over time. 
By taking a brief look at Sino-Russian relations from the social constructivist 
point ofview, we may learn the following interesting facts. 
As aforementioned, the relations between the two countries have deep 
historical roots. I will forward Voskresenski' s argument that "the history of Sino-
Russian relations has still not been as fully studied as it deserves to be" (2003:3). 
History plays a significant role in the complexity of Sino-Russian relations because, 
in the past, Russia and China's warrn relations nearly always ended in serious 
conflicts (1960s, 1989) and previous military confrontations (when Russians 
occupied Manchuria in 1900). The above undoubtedly impacts on the Russian 
-- --·----------- - - - ---------- ---
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perception of China and Chinese as potentially unpredictable ally, limiting mutual 
trust in a long term. 
One of the main reasons for which the history of Sino-Russian relations has 
not yet been fully studied is due to the lack of knowledge of both Chinese and 
Russian languages and cultures among scholars (Voskressenski , 2003). 
This cultural dimension of analysis is offered by the social constructivist 
theory . Cultural differences between Russia and China are important for our analysis 
because they likewise frame the terms of their cooperation. As noted by 
Voskressenski, "Russian researches [in the 1960s -1980s] be gan to stress the 
incompatibility between Asian (Chinese) and Western (Russian) tradition in 
establishing equal diplomatie relations" (Voskressenski, 2003: 15). An 
exemplification of this incompatibility would be the ten-year-long negotiations 
between Russia and China on a common vision for the Eastern Siberian pipeline, and 
more recent disputes on oil prices67 due to not only economie but, as we may assume 
from above also due to cultural reasons. 
3.3 Resuming Sino-Russian Relations 
The social constructivist elements of history and culture in fact underscore the 
same conclusion that was highlighted by our neorealist analysis: that Sino-Russian 
relations are far from being perfect, rather they remain highly unstable. The 
aforementioned limitations, security dilemmas, multiple historical precedents, and 
cultural differences reduce the potential for an effecti ve, long-term and mutually 
beneficiai alliance between Russia and China. 
67 As quite known fact that in Eastern cultures (ex, Chinese and Japanese) agreed priee in 
negotiations does not guarantee respecting it, often parties would try respectfully increase or 
diminish agreed priees due multiple not often objective reasons. 
l 
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Bo Lo's Axis of Convinience (2008) argues that the main goal of Beijing's 
cooperation with Moscow is to keep Russia as a "resource cow", which remains too 
simplistic and narrow. I would agree with Professor Levesque (2011) that this 
conclusion does not reflect the true depth oftheir cooperation. Even though the goals 
of both parts are different and based on their respective national interests, China 
needs support in its foreign political agenda, as muchas Russia needs China' s. 
Sino-Russian relations are pragmatic in their nature; each part strives to 
achieve their respective goals through their partnership with one another, however 
their self-interested motives, often overlap. Examples may show competing interests 
in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics (Mankoff, 2009). And similarly, the 
most recent one in Vietnam, when in April 2012 Russian Gasprom signs a deal of 
exploration of continental shelf in the South China Sea68 This is again taken 
painfully by the Beijing: 
" ... Russia should not send any wrong or ambiguous signais about the South China 
Sea. It will not only make the dispute (Vietnam and Philippines) even more difficult 
to settle for China, but a Iso rai ses doubts about Russia ' s real intentions behind the 
gas deal. "69 
All of the above brings to the general conclusion that Sino-Russian relations 
remain efficient for short-terrn goal such as counter-balance US policy in Central 
Asia, but quite unpredictable in the long-term, affected by multiple limitations 
(security dilemmas) and preserve room for potential disputes. 
68 Point of territorial dispute between China and Vietnam 
69 M.K. Bhadrakumar «A fly in China's Russian ointment». Asia times. April17, 2012 
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Cod ename Dates Location Partners Troops involved 
Peace Mission 18-26 August Vladivostok, Russ ia; China, Ru ssia 10 000 solcliers 
2005 2005 Shandong province, China; 
YellowSea 
Peace Mission 9- 17 August Urumqi, Autonomou s China, Russia, 6500 soldiers 
2007 2007 Region Xinjiang, China; Kazakhstan, 
Chelyabinsk Oblas t, Milita ry Kyrgyzstan, 
District Volga- Vrai, Russia Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Peace Mission 22-26 july Tao na n, jilin province, China, Russia 2600 soldiers 
2009 2009 China; Khabarovsk, 
Khabarovsk Krai, Russia 
. . . . 
" 
' /J Table 3.1: Forces Parhcipatmg m MIIItary Exercises Peace MISSion.' 
72 Dark green co lor represents full members, light green represent the observers of SCO 
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CHAPTER 4. RUS SIAN ROLE IN POST SOVIET REGION. SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RUS SIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In previous chapters we have analysed the potential for Russia's alliance with 
the West (U.S.) and East (China), and defined the significant limitations ofMoscow's 
long-term cooperation with each. In addition, both case studies were aligned with 
Waltz's neorealist theory and its central tenets, namely: the elements of survival, 
balance of power, role of resources, etc., which excludes variables such as role of 
history and identity . 
In this final Chapter, we will examine Russia's third foreign policy option in 
the multipolar world: consolidating itself as an independent pole and regional 
hegemon in former Soviet territory. Russia's position as a dominating regional power 
is not a historie anomaly. This extended reach and control began under the Russian 
Empire as early as the 1700s and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Today, this poli ti cal objective of regaining control is a central goal ofRussian foreign 
policy since it is central to state security as weil as international recognition. 
It is argued here, that at present, the Kremlin will lean to position itself in the 
world as an independent pole that will be in control of the former Soviet republic 
nations. Furthermore, seeking an alliance with either the East or the West (but likely 
not bath) remains a secondary priority for Russian policy makers, serving for 
pragmatic, often short term political (balance of power, bandwagoning, etc. ) and 
economie purposes. Current external systemic factors and internai variables are 
prompting Russia to continue its foreign policy strategy of regaining and 
consolidating control over post-Soviet terri tory as part of vital national interests. The 
main analytical lens that will be used to illustrate this position is social 
constructivism, specifically the role of historie continuity, national identity, and 
social factors (Finnemore, 1996). 
- - -·- ---
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4.1 The Russian Ruling Elite and the Three Visions ofRussian Foreign Policy 
We will first examine the pattern of Rus si a' s foreign po licy from a historical 
perspective. Over the centuries, the foreign policy of what is today called the Russian 
Federation has fluctuated between alliances with the West (Peter the Great, 
Gorbatchev, Kozyrev), consolidating itself as a regional power (Russian Empire), and 
even at times having global ambitions (Lenin, Stalin, Marxists Global Revolution). 
This fluctuation has been analysed by severa! scholars of international relations, 
primarily through the use of the social constructivist lens. Ted Hopf and Andrey 
Tsygankov are the two central authors that have attempted to explain Russian foreign 
policy through the application of this theory. Both emphasize the impact of identity 
and ideology of the Russian elite on the Kremlin's foreign policy (Petersburg in the 
Tsarist past). The visions of these two scholars differ slightly from one another but 
the core oftheir analyses remains the same. 
In Hopfs work (1999) we may distinguish between two different national 
identities: (1) The New Western Russian (NWR) aspiring toward Europeanization 
(seeing themselves as part of European civilization), democratization and the 
decentralization of state control; and (2) The New Soviet Man (NSM) that sees 
Russia as "the Great Power which Russia always was", rather than just being a "part" 
of Europe, while placing an emphasis on the strong centralization of state power 
(Hopf, 1999). 
Tsygankov has a slightly different and more detailed division of Russian 
national identity into three types. The First, Westernizers, comprise those who 
identify themselves as part of European (Western) civilization and strive for liberal 
reforms, as weil as a decentralized state. Second, there are the Statists74 who are 
characterized by a pragmatic vision of balancing alliances between the West and the 
East, emphasizing internai stability and centralized power control. Statists also strive 
74 From "de1javniki" . Der java stands not only country and state but as well Great Power. 
- -- -----·- --- - --- - --- -
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to ensure that Russia is recognized intemationally as a Great Power. Third are the 
Civilizionists; those with an extreme vision ofRussia as a civilization apart, pursuing 
its own course in world politics (apart from the East or West), as an independent 
empire with control over neighbouring regions. 
There are a number of historical examples of the different national identities 
presented by Tsygankov. The identities of the Civilizationists and Westernizers will 
be explored very briefly before we delve into the identity of the Statists in depth. The 
reason why our analysis will focus on the latter is because the current ruling political 
elite in Russia are Statists, and thus focusing on this identity will enable us to better 
ascertain Russia's current and projected position in the multipolar world. 
Civilizationists have been prominent throughout Russian history. For 
example, the Tsar Ivan IV ("The Terrible") and the powerful role of the Russian 
Orthodox church in the region in the sixteenth century, Lenin-Trotsky (1917-1921) 
and the central role of Russia in the global Marxist revolution, who perceived Russia 
as an independent civilization and empire wherein Soviet republics are its provinces 
(presently, V. Jirinovsky and G. Ziuganov represent this identity stream). 
The famous Westernizers in Russian history are Peter the Great and 
Alexander I (Holy Alliance) who reformed Russia's foreign policy and military 
through the implementation of Western ideals. Recently, Gorbachev and his New 
Thinking (1985-1990) together with Kozyrev's pro-West policy (1991-1993) also 
represent this vision (Tsygankov, 2006). 
It should also be mentioned that there have historically been Russian national 
identities that balance between two different spheres. For example, Primakov's Great 
Power constituted a balance between Civilizationists and Statists. He put a focus on 
power balancing in international politics and aimed to position Russia as a great 
world power with an independent foreign policy (Tsygankov, 2006:9-12 and Ch 3). 
79 
Putin and the current Russian political elite are clearly Statists. As Mankoff 
remarks in his book Russian Foreign policy (2009), the design and execution of 
Russia's foreign policy remains the exclusive right of a small circle of political elite, 
with no input from independent political organisations . This Russian political 
hegemon is contrasted with the West's policy making, where political think tanks, 
institutions and NGOs equally contribute, shape and influence foreign policy of 
Western states. The ideology and identity of Russia's political elite determine the 
country's present political course (Mankoff, 2009). While the above internai elements 
are disregarded by neorealism, it will be shown here that they have a significant 
impact on Russian foreign policy as do Waltz's external systemic factors. 
Furthermore, they explain the radical shifts in the course ofRussia's foreign policy in 
greater depth. 
Serghei Medvedev's Power, !Jpace and Russian Foreign Policy (1999) 
presents a historical continuity that illustrates the relations between the centralized 
and decentralized power and the stability and instability of the Russian state from 
the1480s to 1993. In his work, "Culture One" (Westernizers) are associated with the 
decentralized leadership that is characterized by more freedom, which in turn produce 
societal progress. However these reforms weaken the state power and often result in 
internai political turmoil and instability. Conversely, "Culture Two" (Statists), are 
associated with vertical leadership and constraints, apparently resulting in a stronger 
and more stable state able to maintain internai discipline influence international 
politics. Though, having a "strong" state is also characterised by societal stagnation 
and a resistance of progress. (Hopf, 1999). 
The above descriptions serve to underscore Russia's continuous dilemma 
between maintaining a "strong" yet stagnant state produced by the Statists and astate 
characterized by societal modernization and followed by weakness of state ( defined 
above), produced by Westernizers. In this cycle, when the state weakens there 
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becomes a necessity to restore its power, which often results in a dictatorship that 
subsequently ends with painful reforms or revolutions. 
Here l' d like to emphasize the importance and the year- 1999, which is prior 
to Putin's era -, and to link it to subsequent and present circumstances in Russia. 
Putin, who came to power in the year 2000, started to act exactly in accordance with 
the above description of a Statist. One of the main goals of his leadership would be 
the consolidation of state internai and external power and, by consequence, restoring 
Russia as a great power. The latter implies making Russia as independent 
international actor, with regional hegemon capacity able to exert control over former 
Soviet Republics, which represents vital territory for the Kremlin . This will likely 
happen at cost of confrontation with other great powers for incidences wherein 
Russian national interests are not respected or are challenged (as demonstrated 
through recent Russian-Georgian military conflict) . 
Knowing the political identity of the present ruling elite helps to identify the 
main priori ti es of its internai and externat political course, which direct! y or indirect! y 
impact Russian foreign policy. 
Internally, one of the main goals for the Statists (in our case for Putin and his 
team) is to remain in power by ali means necessary. Sorne reasons for this are self-
evident, but below are sorne arguments related to Russian particularities that may 
explain this. In the last century every Russian leadership change has been dramatic. 
The new power, which replaces the old one, is always characterized as revisionist and 
revanchist toits predecessors. Soviet history contains both : examples of Machiavelli 
struggles for power and the "revanchism". In 1917, Bolsheviks assassinated the 
Tzar's family; Stalin killed his opponents after Lenin's death; Khrushchev executed 
Beria and dismissed from positions those who served with Stalin; Democrats in 1991 
dismissed Communists, etc. (Lukas, 2008, Lo, 2002). 
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This phenomenon of power transition, characteristic to Russia, is clearly a 
cultural particularity found ali over post-Soviet territories. The roots of this are in a 
history having a lack of any traditional practical mechanism of giving up or transit to 
the succeeding power. The most common reason for political replacement in Soviet 
and Russian history was death, revolution, or critical illness. Today this regional 
particularity is not much different. The most sound and recent example is the ongoing 
imprisonment of Timoshenko (former Ukrainian prime-minister) by president 
Yanukovitch in Ukraine (2011). 
To demonstrate why the aforementioned details are relevant to the thesis tepic 
let us examine the following point. Since at present there are no indicators of any 
sufficiently challenging opposition ready to take over power from the Statist regime, 
the assumption is made that Putin's team will maintain and further consolidate its 
power over the State and the current foreign policy will persist for the foreseeable 
future. Let us review sorne facts that support the above assumption. First, the most 
evident argument is Putin's "tandem formula" which allows him to bypass 
constitutionallimitations in regards to presidential terms: 
'~o one person shall hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more 
than two tenns in succession. "(article 81.3 of Russian Constitution) 
Near the end of Putin's presidency he neither immediately sought an 
extension of office into a third term nor attempted change the duration of the 
presidential mandate (four years). A solution was found by the Russian leadership : 
the appointment of Medvedev for Russian presidency in the interim and make Putin 
the prime-minister with enlarged power, including power over foreign policy issues 
(which de facto kept Putin in power). Shortly after, the Duma council, mostly 
controlled by Putin's party "Yedynnaya Rossia" (United Russia), voted to change the 
constitution in order to increase the presidential term for up to six years75 . In 2012, to 
75 Article 81.1 of Russian Constitution 
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no surprise, the president ofRussia was once again Vladimir Putin. Of course there is 
very little doubt that his stay in power is intended to be for the minimum of the next 
12 years. This example demonstrates a clear intention of current leadership to find 
legitimate (constitutional) ways to stay in power for longer. 
The second argument I will present here serves the ruling elite's purpose of 
complete elimination of "pure" opposition to the present regime. In 2000, The 
Russian Duma council consisted of parties from about 6 major poli ti cal blocs, two of 
which were pro-Western democrats before Putin and the election threshold for parties 
was 3%. However, in 2007 and in 2011 the election threshold was raised to 7%76, 
which made it impossible for the smaller parties to surpass it. Today only 4 parties 
represent the Russian Duma: Putin's Edinnaya Rossia, Communist party (KPRF), 
Liberal Democratie Party (LDPR) and Spravedlivaia Rossia (Fair Russia) . Two of 
those parties, LDPR and Spravedlivaia Rossia are supportive of Putin's actions, but 
KPRF maintains its status quo in Russian politics (mostly not limiting present 
Power). 
Other tactics may serve the long term goal of maintaining control, many of 
which Putin has launched in the last 12 years. It is assumed that Putin and his party 
are trying to legitimize their long stay in power by being citing a need to "finish 
started projects" in the "biggest country of the world"77 Among these projects we 
may stress the restoration of Russian power and seeking international recognition, as 
well the integration process with the former Soviet territories. In large part these 
goals are accomplished through the use of existing regional institutions (CIS, CSTO, 
Customs Unionf8 . 
76 If a party scores between 4-6% they are granted 1-2 sits (not proportional to percentage) 
77 Then Russian Du ma voted increase of presidential terms from 4 to 6 years, one of the main 
arguments served that such a big country as Russia 4 years is not enough to implement long term 
projects. 
78 Presented later in the chapter. 
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Also, these projects go hand-in-hand with an identity quest for Russia .. So let us look 
briefly into this further. 
4.2 Russian Identity and Russian National ldea 
lt was already mentioned that the role of identity in Social Constructivism is 
important, which helps explain the direction of the state's foreign policy in Russia. 
For example, the Russian political progress towards Westernisation between 1992 
and 1995 may be linked with a pro-European identity, while sudden turns in 1996 and 
since 2004 are connected with a "westernization identity crisis" (Huntington, 1996: 
76) and a pro-nationalistic response to this crisis. The path to Westernization had 
failed, and under Primakov Russia had distanced itself from Europe. However, 
between 1996 and 1999 Russia was still unable to re-build and establish itself as a 
true big power with International influence comparable to other great powers of the 
world. The economie crisis of 1998 created prospects of an even gloomier future for 
Russian ambitions to become one of the globe's poles. Nevertheless, Putin ' s actions 
aimed to restore Russian internai stability and economie recovery through the 
centralization of power coupled with high oil priees started to bring positive results 
(since 2001). The catastrophic events in the United States on September 11th, 2001 
were seen by Putin as an opportunity to re-build relations with the USA and the 
Western world . From the reali st point of view this can be explained as a pragmatic 
calculation (bandwagoning, balance of power or economie gains) . But from a 
constructivist point of view this is a decision that can be explained through the role of 
identity, In this case, it is the natural desire (due toits identity and historie past) to be 
part of Western civilization. Russian internai debate over the question of Russian 
identity (European or Asian) may be summarized in the following quote by Putin : 
"We are part of the Western European Culture. No matter where our people live, in 
the Far East or in the South, we are Europeans." - V Putin (Tsygankov, 2006: 127). 
----l 
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However today, we may observe that Russia follows the path of a so called 
"unique identity" 79, with a direct connection with neither the East nor West. Under 
this identity, present Russian leaders aim to re-build a great Russia, but to do so Putin 
and his team need to unite its people under the same national idea. Finding the 
Russian national idea remains a hard task for the current leadership. Let us briefly 
look at how these factors impacted internai and external policies of the Russian 
Federation. 
At first, the main Russian nationaJ drive (as part of bigger NationaJ idea) 
under Purin was to rapidly increase the wealth of the general population, trying to 
reach the level of those living in Western European countries (in the long run) . 
Consequently, In 2000-2004 the Russian economy demonstrated significant recovery 
and growth stimulated by the rising priees of hydro-carbonates coming from Russia, 
while Putin promised to double GDP by the end of 2008. The goal of "Udvoennie 
VVP80" (double GDP) was largely supported during Putin's first presidential term. 
Those ambitions were mostly welcomed by with the West and Putin ' s persona! 
friendship with German and Italian leaders strengthened, which was hoped to help 
open European doors for economie cooperation81 But in 2004, after the presidential 
re-election, the "double GDP" ideology was quickly discarded due to the 
impossibility of fulfilling of this goal in such a short term. For sorne time the main 
ideological goal remained to "improve the wealth and life-style of the Russian 
people". Later this populist goal has also failed, mainly due to internai problems 
related to Russian chronic problems: poor management, and corruption which has 
persisted in Russian society since Soviet times. 
79 1n Huntington we may observe term of Orthodox civilisation (1996), but it is definitely more th an 
just religious. 
80 VVP stands for GDP (in Russian) but a Iso the first letters of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin' s na me 
(VVP) 
81 EU remains Russia's biggest economie partners and contributor to Russian GDP 
---- - -----, 
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The second term ofPutin's presidency (2004-2008) is characterized by further 
attempts to consolidate a nationai idea, which would unite Russian people and will 
drive them to ultimate goal to build a strong and capable Russia. This time, the 
Kremlin put an emphasis on vital national interests (chapter 1) to preserve Russia as a 
united and strong state, capable of conducting independent foreign policy, and 
defending its interests while being internationally recognized for doing so. These 
interests held important geo-political significance for Kremlin regarding the 
surrounding independent territories of the post-Soviet territories. Presidential 
declaration as weil as many important strategie documents clearly stress Russian 
political objectives of restoring former power and might, and to place itself as one of 
the globe's independent influences. In other words, they felt that: "the Russian 
Federation possesses real capacity to play a weil deserved role globally" 82 
Since 2004/2005, Russia has dramatically changed both its internai and 
extemal policies. This has mostly been fuelled by worsening relations with USA, 
political crisis and revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, as weil as internai problems 
and counter-measures aimed at straightening state control. As seen by the Russian 
people, Moscow gradually generates a negative image of NATO, which is lead 
large! y by the USA, which is threatening stability of the Russian state. This Kremlin-
originated propaganda is massively supported by Russian mass-media, which 
happens to also be run by the Kremlin. The USA and other Western countries are 
presented as hostile entities with the goal of weakening Russia and gaining control 
over their resources. Russian ideology makers are certainly well aware of the fact that 
nothing unites people more efficiently than having a common enemy and threat. This 
also serves to reduce public attention from other problems within the country such as 
corruption and the low standards of life that the majority of the Russian population 
live in. 
82 The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation from July 2008 
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From a theoretical perspective, this may be paralleled with constructivist view 
ofWendt: 
"This seems to be happening today in the United States and the former Soviet Union: 
without the cold war's mutual attributions of threat and hostility to define their 
identities, these states seem unsure of what the ir "interests" should be" (Wendt, 1992) 
By presenting a negative image of NATO to the Russian people, the Kremlin 
legitimizes its controversial internai and extemal policy actions. At first, Moscow 
interdicts any foreign financial support to Russian NGO's and created its own youth 
organisation, called "Nashi" (ours) aimed at opposing the pro-Western organisations 
which stood behind the revolutions in Belgrade, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kirghizstan 
(MacKinnon, 2009). 
It should also be noted that Russian mass media has radically changed its 
content from highly political program into highly entertaining programming. The 
purpose behind this seems quite evident: once again to distract people from the 
important issues faced by the country and to !essen awareness of any opposition to 
those in power. Most Russians get their information from TV and Radio. Since 
Putin's people controls ali opposition channels, previously sponsored by oligarchs 
(tycoons), via the purchase through the Kremlin's loyal companies and holdings. 
Today Russian mass-media is quite distant from politics, does not permit any critique 
of Putin's policy and most of the news look like it did in the former Soviet Union: 
presenting only successes of current leadership and "evil" plans of the West, led 
principally by the USA83 . At the same time those watching Russian TV may observe 
a tendency to promote the image of "nashi". However, 1 would like to make an 
important point that in Russian the term "nashi" (ours) has a very strong meaning: 
those who come from Soviet Union, identified as soviet brothers. Russian TV and 
mass-media is still widely popular over the entire ex-Soviet terri tories ( especially first 
Russian Chanel- "Pervyi Kanal") . Since 2008 (when Russian-US relations were at a 
83 Multiple examples may be found in Russian media for example "Magnitski Act" as most recent. 
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maximum tension over disputes in Georgia) the above-mentioned propaganda became 
even more intense. 
Another example to support propaganda of a nostalgie common past and 
shared interestsis that Russian BBC radio, when discussing political news via public 
debates, receives phone calls from ali nations of the former Soviet Union. Then the 
most famous humoristic TV show titled "KVN" (has been on TV for 50 years 
already) in 2010 included contestants on teams from ali the ex-Soviet Republics 
including Baltic States, but not including Georgia. The main message here was that of 
regret of no longer being united in a once strong country (USSR)84. 
Putin as well Medvedev have always presented their position in regards tore-
building the Soviet Union as non-sense since the authoritarian system of the USSR is 
a poli ti cal and ideological dead-end (Hopf, 201 0). However, in reality it is not 
al ways as they say. Hopf presents arguments of contemporary Rus sian manuals for 
history where communist ontology persists (e.g. division of society in working class 
and bourgeois). In addition, both Russian leaders and multiple political figures in 
other countries are quite nostalgie for the former Soviet might. Putin (2005) 
personally stated that: 
"First and foremost it is worth acknowledging that the demise of the Soviet Union 
was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century". 
There are little hints present in the details surrounding this quote referring to a 
hidden agenda to re-build not Soviet-Union per se, but certainly Russia having a 
similar capacity and influence as the USSR did in the past. For example, when Putin 
met with George Bush to discuss Kiev's potential intention to join NATO (2008), 
Putin was quoted as saying that "Ukraine is not even astate" (Levesque 2009, 2012). 
Further, in April of 2007 on one of the political news TV editions, presenter Leonov 
would name Ukraine as a Russian province trying to play dangerous games with 
84 The popularity of th at show can be a Iso supported by the fa ct th at President Putin and Medvedev 
would assist on this 3 hours show as part of the ir electorate program in 2004, 2009 and 2011 
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Moscow through its aspirations to join NATO. Historically Ukraine has never existed 
as independent state and for the last 300 years was part of the Russian empire. In this 
light, most Russians and even many Ukrainians see Ukraine as part of Rus si a and not 
as an independent state. Similarly, quite recently, a teacher at a Russian school in 
Moldova wrote a letter to president Putin asking for help and protection from the 
Russian leader (20.08.2012), thereby ignoring pro-Western Moldovan leadership of 
today. This presents Putin's power and authority as unchallenged in the entire post-
Soviet region. This is not random or unique in post-Soviet space, and there are many 
other examples demonstrating a very strong legacy of Soviet identity (nashi - ours) 
which is still so strong that often challenges other post Soviet republics national 
identities. The majority of Byelorussians, Ukrainians and a big part of Moldovans 
still identify themselves with Russian speaking population loyal to Moscow, often 
nostalgie for Soviet past. 
Let us briefly summarize this: tens of millions of people ail over of former 
Soviet Union still identify themselves as Soviet . Using the term "nash" (our), they 
regret the dissolution of the mighty USSR. This enormous human resource, which 
identifies itself under the same is definitely not ignored by the Kremlin. And why 
should it be ignored? Presently only a few have profited from the market economy 
and improved their lives accordingly, while the huge majority of the former Soviet 
population, mostly those who are now 40 years old or over, have a lower qualîty of 
life and certainly miss Soviet times. In the same light, older populations remain 
suspicious of American (Western) intentions, and support the Kremlin's hard line for 
power centralisation. Many of those pro-"nashi" live in near abroad: Ukraine, 
Byelorussia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and even in Baltic States 
and have a strong Russian speaking community which supports Kremlin's policy at 
the level of the society. 
Russia in 1992 is not comparable in strength to Russia today. Available 
economie resources collected from oil and gas revenues since 2001 have allowed 
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Moscow to defend its vital interests, including through challenging global powers in 
regional affairs. As well, the Kremlin uses alternative means to exert it's influence 
which are not exclusively realist by nature: the role of identity in trying to legitimize 
Russian "rights" over the neighbouring territories and dealing with ex-Soviet 
Republics. 
" The history of Russian Soviet control has created a series of cultural-economie and 
politicallinkages that make reliance on Moscow a relatively familiar strategy for the 
soviet trained elite of most CIS countries" (Mankoff, 2009: Cp6. Conclusions) . 
Beginning from this perspective, let us now examine how today Russia is 
usmg the non-declared idea of re-integrating Post-Soviet territories under its 
leadership in order to legitimize its foreign policy interests of controlling 
neighbouring states and consolidating itself as regional hegemon. 
4.3 Russian Influence and Actions in Post-Soviet Territories 
In order for Russia to carry out its mandate of expansion, consolidation of 
strength in the surrounding region, and international recognition, the government 
must at times be aggressive and even ruthless with its actions. Although this is not a 
quality that is unique to Russia, there are multiple signs, indications, declarations, and 
other actions which demonstrate Russia's intentions to become a regional hegemon 
and be recognized intemationally for its power and legitimacy. Below I would like to 
bring severa! facts to light regarding Russia' s prioritization and efforts in foreign 
policy aimed at the consolidation of its position as leading power in post-Soviet 
territory and restoring it's international role as a "great power". 
As mentioned already, Russia's priority for state security is to be able to 
control the neighbouring countries due to the geopolitical values for Moscow, here 
are sorne examples. Ukraine rents maritime bay to Russian Black Sea Naval Fleet, 
similarly Moscow rents the Baykonur cosmodrome from Kazakhstan and 
--- --- - ---
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successfully negotiates with Astana over oïl exports. Moldova remains an important 
territory for Russian military bases and ammo depots. Abkhazia retains value to 
Moscow due to accessibility to the Eastern si de of the Black Sea; and Turkmenistan 
is valuable due to its natural gas. Post-Soviet territory represents major political 
interest for Moscow (also see chapter 1). Through its aggressive actions in South 
Abkhazia against Georgia (2008) and poli ti cal involvement in Ukraine (2009-20 1 0), 
Russia recently has demonstrated that it is not ready to give up crucial territories such 
as Ukraine and Georgia while being "completely encircled by NATO" (Mankoff, 
2009: 241-243). 
The geopolitical importance of former Soviet republics for a Russian sense of 
security is not a deduced conclusion based on a political analysis of Moscow's 
actions in this regard, but it is also officially declared in fundamental Russian 
documents. 
In reading the recent "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" 
(July, 2008), which is defined as : " a system of views on the content, principles and 
main areas of the foreign policy activities of Russia"85, we instantly grasp the 
importance of the former Soviet Republic territories also known as Commonwealth 
of the Independent States (CIS). Here are sorne self-explanatory quotes from this 
document in regard to CIS and Russia' s vision of itself as global great power and 
their envisioned ways to fulfil these priorities : 
"The Russian Federation possesses real capacity to play a welldeserved role 
globally." 
"Russia pursues an open, predictable and pragrnatic foreign policy determined by its 
national interests." 
"Development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS Member 
States constitutes a priority area of Russia 's foreign policy". (Fow1d in part IV. 
Regional priorities) 
85 http://a rchive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml 
---- -------
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"Particular attention is paid to supporting compatriots who live in the crs Member 
States, as weil as to negotiating mutual agreements intended to protect their 
educational, Iinguistic, social, labor, humanitarian and other rights and freedoms ." 
"Russia will increase cooperation with the crs Member States [ ... ] 
To achieve these goals Russia will : 
take steps to ensure further realization of the potential of the crs as a regional 
organization [ ... ], 
continue agreed efforts to create favorable conditions for effective establishment of 
the Union State by gradually transforming relations between Russia and Belams [ .. . ]; 
actively interact with Belarus and Kazakhstan within the Eurasian Economie 
Community (EurAsEC) in order to establish a customs union and common economie 
space and encourage other EurAsEC Member States to participate in this work; 
promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
as a key instrument to maintain stability and cnsurc sccurity in the crs arca." 
The above citations also confirm the commitment of the Russian federation in 
continuing its leadership role within the CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, and ether institutional 
projects. 
To probe even further, let us question why Russia would be unwilling to give 
up its leading positions in the region? It may be evident at this point that Russia's 
survival depends largely on maintaining a geographical and ideological separation 
from the Western work in arder to survive; in order to maintain geographical 
separation Russia must maintain control over neighbouring states. Nevertheless, we 
have already discussed the importance of maintaining control over former-Soviet 
terri tory and briefly mentioned that parts of this region have become points of interest 
for ether global powers such as the USA (Georgia, Ukraine, Central Asia), the EU 
(Ukraine, Moldova), and China (mostly Central Asia). Now 1 would like to elaborate 
on the detail s of the available tools of influence that Moscow has at their disposai 
which distinguish them from other maj or powers. 
As weil, Russia shares a huge historie and cultural past, and by consequence 
ties, with the surrounding republics . Currently, most of the political elite over the 
post-Soviet territories share the same upbringing and education connected in sorne 
1 
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way to Russia. It is also important to mention the Russian presence and available 
tools within each of the respective republics. When analyzing the appearance, size, 
and agenda of Russian Embassies in republics like Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine and 
others, we would come to the same conclusion: Russia is sending a strong message of 
long-term presence and influence in the region. By mere presence and presentation 
of this presence in these countries, Russia is asserting dominance over their people in 
a strength comparable to the goveming body within that country. 
Apart from symbolic messages such as the placement of these embassies, 
there are of course much more solid reminders ofRussian power in the former Soviet 
Union. Namely, this is the presence of Russian military in severa! states previously 
mentioned (see table 1.1) cooped with Russian role in frozen conflicts ali over post-
Soviet land. This not only demonstrates a Russian commitment to defend its interests 
at ali cost, but it empowers Russia with colossal tools do so when at any moment of 
its choosing. 
Another major tool, sometimes compared to nuclear weapons in terms of 
importance, is of course Russian natural gas and Moscow's policy to push on so-
called "rebels" by raising gas priees. The reality today that natural gas is a rare 
commodity lacking alternatives for most of former Soviet republics located in 
Europe. They are entirely dependent on Russia for gas imports. In viewing Moscow's 
political behaviour one can clearly notice that since 2005 the Kremlin has never 
hesitated to use this dependence as a tool to reach its objectives (examples include; 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even Byelorussia). This form of economie levers, 
that effectively amounts to acts of extortion, are likely not practiced only by Russia 
and in ali likelihood are a common occurrence in political or military conflicts 
throughout the world. Nonetheless, here it is used to further the agenda of the 
consolidation of post-soviet era territories and the further strengthening of the 
Russian state. 
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4.4 Russia's Leadership Role in Regional Institutions 
Finally, and probably most significantly, Russia continually re-affirms itself 
as regional hegemon through the integration processes occurring within existing 
institutions in the area now dominated large! y by Moscow. Sorne of these institutions 
have existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). These institutions represent mostly declarative or formai 
value in reality, but sorne of them nevertheless have recently evolved much more 
solid forms of cooperation. 
ln this thesis we will only introduce these institutions and briefly touch upon 
significant achievements and weak points related to our topic. 
The most well-known institution is of course CIS, which includes ail the 
former republics under its umbrella with the exception of the Baltic States86 and 
Georgia (since 2008)87. The significance of this institution is uncertain however, 
since most of the declarations and agreements it has made have never been 
implemented and were lacking political will and a clear agenda. Most meetings are 
held with only at vice-ministers leve!, and they cover various subjects related to 
economy, military, and culture. Nonetheless, CIS remains an important vehicle of 
bilateral and multilateral political and economie affairs. Using the CIS platform, 
severa! larger projects have been launched. For example, integration initiatives like 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Customs Union and Eurasian 
Economie Community are discussed below. 
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) was signed into 
existence in 1992. CSTO unites the most significant allies of Russia: Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Byelorussia. Collective security is the main 
86 Baltic States never shared identity proximity with Russia even du ring Soviet times and were largely 
supported by EU to leave Moscow's orbit and lately accepted in NATO and EU since the collapse of 
USSR 
87 immediately after the military collapse with Russian in August 2008 
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purpose of this organisation and has many similarities with the concept of a European 
NATO. 
We may note that Central Asian republics demonstrate a recognition of the 
Ieading role of Russia in the region. Historically since Soviet Union, these countries 
have profited the most from donations and were at last recognized as independent in 
the 1990s. A significant achievement for Moscow through this institution (CSTO) is 
Russia's deployment of military troops to Kyrgyzstan in 2003 (Mankoff, 2009: 268). 
As weil, apart from SCO, where Russia shares a Ieading position with China, CSTO 
"has emerged as primarily vehicle for the re-establishment of Moscow' s strategie 
influence in central Asia." (Mankoff, 2009: 270) 
In 2008 this institution demonstrated sorne limitations of its potential. During 
the Russian-Georgian conflict, CSTO members supported Russia's actions; however, 
none of the CSTO members supported Russia's recognition of separatist Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (Levesque, 2012). This in turn may be explained by internai 
separatist issues in sorne of the CSTO members. As weil, despite the fact that CSTO 
has a joint general staff, its "cohesiveness" and ability to react to common threats 
remain under "serious doubt", thereby limiting military effectiveness of the 
organisation (Mankoff, 2009:270). 
Russian foreign policy actions aimed at re-instailing its influence in post-
Soviet territories can also be demonstrated by the intensive re-integration into 
existing institutions. Primakov was the first to re-energize the existing Russian - CrS 
community relations and, as we may observe, during Putin's second term. Moscow 
actively promotes integration initiatives (not only under CSTO and SCO) with 
pragmatic purposes. First foremost is the significant breakthrough in the CrS Customs 
Union which tightens the economie space between Russia, Byelorussia, and 
Kazakhstan. The agreement was originaily signed in 1995-1996, but was revived 
again in 2009. rts practical phase started in 2011-2012, opening its doors to other 
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participants if they so desire. Kyrgyzstan is among the first candidates to join the 
union. Russia currently wishes to bring Ukraine closer in this sense, but the main 
obstacle remains to be the intensive struggle for Kiev between Russia and the West as 
well as counter-lobbying of Ukrainian oligarchs who have a lot to lose through this 
integration. 
In the same light, Putin's initiative reflected in Russian Izvestia in October 
2011is the development of Euro Asiatic Union (EuRasEC). This is an ambitious 
project by Putin that aims to build a strong economie institution mainly formed from 
"near abroad" countries. The core participants remain state-formers of Customs 
Union but other republics "are invited". 
This initiative is of course in part a strong PR tool for Purin to gain faveur 
before the presidential elections which took place in March of 2012. This initiative in 
fact helps Putin and its ruling elite in many aspects. 
(1) At first it helps to legitimize Putin's come back: to lead a long-term 
project in which Russia is playing the key-role in the region which requires a strong 
leader that very likely can only be Putin himself; 
(2) From a marketing point-of-view it hits hard : The majority of Russians and 
the entire Post-Soviet territory population which is quite nostalgie for former Soviet 
times, and as we have previously mentioned they have been prepared for this 
possibility through different means of indoctrination including pro-Russian and anti-
Western propaganda over the last eight years; 
(3) Covers the ideological gap discussed earlier in this chapter and replaces 
the previously failed goals such as quickly achieving national prosperity and re-
storing Russia as a great global power. Russia leading the EuRasEC means a strong 
and powerful state able to compete with other world's leading powers; 
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(4) By looking differently (at a personality leve!) at this initiative and its key 
leaders we may remark that ali of the head participants such as Putin, Nazarbayeev 
and Lukashenko ail share common goal: prolonging their stay in power. For ali of 
these leaders the participation in the new union opens a Jegitimate door to introduce 
changes in the existing constitutions and other fundamental acts; and 
(5) Despite Putin's declarations regarding the role and place in the region of 
the Eurasian Union: 
"We do not intend to eut ourselves off, nor do we plan to stand in opposition to 
anyone . The Eurasian Union will be based on universal integration principles as an 
essential part of Greater Europe united by shared values of freedom, democracy, and 
market laws. "88 
Creation of the above union in its way de facto challenges the existing 
European integration processes through creating an alternative for polarised 
populations in countries like Ukraine and Moldova. In both countries, local opinion is 
divided with regard to which political option to choose, European integration, and 
promoting Western values or Cooperation with Russia and energy security. Soin this 
way Russia proposes an alternative way to cooperate with the new institutions and 
with ali members in the fields of economies, energy resources, and national security . 
Once again, through integrating into already-existing regional institutions as 
weil as through the creation of new institutions, Russia is elbowing its way into world 
politics and regaining political strength. In a new multipolar world of rising 
economie and political power rather than pure military might, Russia is clearly taking 
steps in the direction towards securing itself as one of the global centers and an 
internationally respected nation. 
88 Article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin "A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the 
making" C'lzvestia", 3 October 2011) http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-
vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-
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4.5 Resuming Russian Foreign Policy in "Near Abroad" 
In consideration of the ab ove facts, Rus si a' s commitment to becoming a 
regional hegemon is clear and their tactics for achieving this goal are intensively 
implemented throughout the neighbouring regions. These tactics include: 
strengthening of their political and economie leadership in regional institutions (e.g. 
CIS, CSTO, EurAsU), encouraging bilateral co-operation with former Soviet 
Republics, formation and strengthening of a national identity, and exerting constraint 
measures on nearby nations which may include energy blackmail and military action. 
This Russian "third option" (being an independent pole with a global 
influence) in deciding its place in a multipolar world fits "naturally" with Russian 
foreign policy. The outcome produces results such as: the geopolitical advantage of 
having more secure borders for Russia, limiting NATO's further enlargement to the 
East (to Russian borders), and even the securing of its relative monopoly over the 
Russian gas supply to Europe (through the strengthening of their negotiation power 
and international influence). 
The Russian quest of becoming a great power is better explained through 
understanding its national identity and identity of the ruling elite than having just a 
desire to dominate other nations. Russia's foreign policy priority, from the realist 
point of view, could be defined as: defending its statehood and national interests 
through exercising maximum control over neighbouring states, especially those who 
are traditionally under Moscow's influence (ex-Soviet territory), but this perspective 
is overly-simplistic. In looking through the social constructivist lens we may find it 
easier to understand and why Russian foreign policy has deviated to the extremes for 
the last 20 years, and why Moscow seeks equal partnerships with the USA as well as 
recognition by other nations holding significant power (Tsygankov, 2006: Ch. 1). In 
establishing a national identity for itself, it is easier to present Russia to the world as a 
defined set of beliefs, traditions, people, strengths, and borders. This in turn rem oves 
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ambiguity of international perspectives of Russia and allows legitimacy for its vital 
interests (i .e. Secured borders, hegemony over post-Soviet territory). 
At present, the Kremlin possesses ali the necessary tools to control nearby 
nations. Those tools theoretically sound from both points of view: realism and social 
constructivism. These include Russian military presence and its role in the frozen 
conflicts ali over the former Soviet space, a strong dependence of CIS members on 
the Russian economy and natural resources, a large bilateral network and use of 
regional institutions, and of course the historical and cultural ties which aid in 
strengthening bonds between the nations. For the last 12 years Russia hasn't given 
up its interest in holding power over nearby countries, but since 2006 it has 
significantly increased political activity towards consolidating its power in the region. 
Among Russia's successes, the following can be listed : Georgian and Ukrainian 
intentions for obtaining NATO membership is no longer an issue in the foreseeable 
short to medium time-frame, economie sanctions against Moldova have so far been 
effective, the onset of the practical phase of the Customs Union Agreement and 
support for the Euro-Asiatic Union, the successful application of pressure on the USA 
to withdraw its military from Central Asia, and multiple others. 
Russian actions towards regaining political sway and their quest for 
international recognition can be marked through multiple indicators of cooperation at 
the international level. We have already covered the enhanced bilateral cooperation 
with key European powers such as Germany, Italy and France, as weil as improved 
Sino-Russian relations. In addition, Russia remains a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council and plays an important role in various conflict mediations (for 
example in negotiations with Iran). Then of course there is the Russian membership 
in G8 and the Russian-NATO Security Council. Lastly, not to be overlooked is 
Russia's strategie nuclear capacity, one which is comparable only to the USA and 
may serve to strengthen international recognition of Russia' s ambition of 
international recognition as a superpower. Among the unofficial signs of fulfilling 
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their objective is of course the enormous energy and effort invested by Russia and 
Pu tin himself into winning the rights to host the Olympie Games in Soc hi in 2014 and 
the football World Cup in 2018, which have been interpreted by Moscow as signs of 
international recognition. 
In summary, it may be concluded that Russia's prime objective currently is, 
and has been si nee Primakov' s ti me (1996), to establish itself as a centralized 
regional power. This is something that is not only openly declared by the state but it 
is vigorously pursued through continuous actions which are clearly documented in 
contemporary history. Recent "re-elections" of Putin confirm the assumption that this 
trend to continue in the future as Russia strengthens economically and steadily 
consolidates power in the surrounding regions, aiming to regain their international 
recognition as a global leader. 
1 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Summing up this thesis, it is clear that Russian foreign policy today is 
oriented primarily towards its reinforcement as an independent pole in a newly 
emerging multi-polar world. It has become evident that in this process, forming 
partnerships with either the Eastern or Western world is no longer a priority as Russia 
focuses on ether strategie avenues. The Russian quest in finding its political place in 
the world has been ongoing since at least 1992, when the Soviet empire collapsed and 
a "new Russia" was re-born (Thibault, Levesque 1997). Subsequently, Russian 
utopian goals of rapidly joining the "civilized world" and reaching the economie 
levels of Western countries vanished in less than a few years. Security dilemmas and 
the survival ofRussian statehood forced the Kremlin to re-assess its foreign policy in 
a way that weil fits with the roots of Waltz's neorealism : balance of power policies 
and consolidation of state power. This significant turn in Russian policy began under 
Primakov between 1996 and 1999, and continues today under President Putin . 
Decade of Russian ascent fuelled by financial windfalls derived from high oil priees, 
growing European dependence on Russian gas, and a shortfall of cooperation and 
integration with the Western world led Moscow to seek alternative strategie 
partnerships and to rely more on its own inner strengths. 
A strategie alliance between Russia and Western countries today remains a 
less probable option, due to two main reasons. First, there are conflicting visions over 
the future of post-Soviet terri tory . Russia sees itself as an exclusive hegemon in this 
region with historical "rights" over the land and people. Conversely, the United States 
and European powers do not recognize these "rights", and ultimately they see these 
countries as independent from Russian influence and more integrated into Euro-
Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the EU. For Russia this is non-negotiable, 
since it goes against to Moscow's national interests related to state security. The 
second reason is of course NATO's enlargement policy, which is seen by the Kremlin 
1__ ________ _ 
as a direct threat toits national security. The August 2008 events in South Ossetia 
best illustrate Rus si a' s position on the issue. 
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Nonetheless, this does not mean that confrontation is unavoidable, or that cooperation 
is not possible. Russia sends clear signais that it no longer wants to play a secondary 
role in world politics and seeks international recognition. Russia wants a cooperation 
based on mutual benefits and also insist that its own national interests must be 
respected. Today Russian-West relations remain mostly at the level of short term 
political goals or economie benefit. 
A Sino-Russian alliance fits perfectly into the frame of an alternative 
partnership, especially as counter-balancing power against the USA and other 
Western countries. Problematic issues such as US hegemony, NATO enlargement, 
and keeping USA out of Central Asia effective! y work through strengthening the role 
of SCO in the region and developing relations with China. Relations most likely will 
continue on a positive line. Beyond this, China and Russia retain many points of 
friction in their national interests, including competition over the control of Central 
Asia, different visions of the role of SCO, and obviously sorne issues related to 
cultural differences as well. The concerns of a growing Chinese superpower adjacent 
to the Russian border, posing a potential security threat to Moscow, are not to be 
overlooked. The formation of an alliance and good bilateral relations could help to 
alleviate sorne fears that each country may have of one another with regards to 
national security. Nonetheless, these issues will act as impediments in developing 
their relations into a long term and robust alliance. 
The Russian course of foreign policy is oriented towards becoming an 
independent pole capable of conducting independent poli ti cal course at regional and 
even globallevels. It remains the most rational option for the Kremlin and has already 
brought the most productive results. In exerting itself as regional hegemon with the 
political tools to control neighbouring ex-Soviet states, Russia is able to fulfill its 
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primary security interests : secure borders and inhibiting further NATO enlargement 
in the East. 
This third option also fits "naturally" with Russian Foreign policy in terms of 
having ali the necessary fundamentals in place, such as: working regional institutions, 
cultural and historical proximity to their neighbours, and enormous bilateral relations 
with former communist nations. ln addition, the Russian "last-resort" regional tools 
of influence such as military presence in severa! states; the direct dependence of 
many nations on the Russian economy and Russian oil and gas, and of course there is 
overwhelming Russian military forces which demonstrate a better readiness 
compared to the 1990s. 
A doser look at Russian foreign policy today demonstrates that the Kremlin's 
efforts to consolidate its power and international position brought relative success. 
Russia has been leading integration projects on post-Soviet space, using above 
mentioned resources and regional institutions such as CIS, CSTO and the European-
Asiatic Union (EurAsU). The Russian path to becoming a great power lies first in 
being a leader of post-Soviet space. Moscow sees its ability to control its former 
Soviet sisters as a guarantor ofits geopolitical security in the region. 
Throughout this thesis we have seen that both theoretical schools - realism 
(neorealism) and social constructivism - lead us to similar conclusions and 
complement one another when Russian foreign policy needs to be explained in more 
details. While neorealism demonstrates the impact of the extemal elements 
(variables) of the international system on the Kremlin's policy; social constructivism 
introduces other aspects such as identity and historie continuity, which have equal 
influence on the same policy, and is capable offilling the gaps where neorealism falls 
short. 
This thesis also makes the assumption that current Russian foreign policy will 
persist for sorne time, mostly due to the fact that poli ti cal course of Purin has already 
- --------- --------
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been shown as effective in achieving political objectives. And as weil due to the 
elimination of any capable opposition to Putin's rule in present. 
However, Putin's stability does not necessarily mean that Russia will continue its 
growth and increase its international power. Many Russian scholars, even those 
supporting the present regime (Primakov, 2011), sadly remark that the main threat for 
Russia cornes from within. This is similar to the major internai problem of the Soviet 
Empire. The present economy is entirely dependent on oil and gas revenues which are 
extremely vulnerable to economie crises such as those observed in 1998 and 2008. 
The "easy money" earned from high oil priees is not invested in new technology and 
other crucial infrastructure for a successful modern economy, but rather fall into the 
persona! accounts of those close to the Kremlin. Corruption and bureaucracy are at 
the same level today in Russia as they were before and after the collapse of the 
USSR. The following is a quote from the director of Troyka dialogue company - R . 
Vardanean- on Russian business today: 
"We have enormous bureaucracy and weak public institutions. The role of Public 
institutions fell to secondary positions, white the role of persona! relations is 
definitely the most important today. This is not only for business, but in every area of 
Russian society." (quoted by Prin1akov 2011: lOO) . 
The list of Russian internai problems does not limit itself to the above. It includes 
also demographie issues, !ife quality of population, etc. , etc. 
Nevertheless with today's accumulated resources, established relations, working 
effective regional institutions led by Moscow, and proven realist tactics will keep 
Russia on the path of developing itself into "one of the globe's pole"89 (regional 
hegemon). Ali other alternatives of mutually beneficiai co-operation with major 
global powers remain highly affected by the security dilemmas, and this in turn forces 
Moscow to keep these relations at a pragmatic level. 
89 Foreign Po licy Concept of the Russian Federation. July, 2008 
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